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７ABSTRACT
The topic of this study is the fiscal decentralization (FI) in Republic of Korea (Korea). 
As a world-wide trend, FI has also been adopted and implemented in Korea, particularly
since the democratization of 1987. As a redistribution of limited resources between 
national and sub-national government (SNG), FI is essentially political in that various 
political actors interact to achieve more resources.
With the research problem of the fiscal tensions between SNGs and national
government, the objective of this thesis is to assess the process of FI in Korea in its
contexts since 1987. Research questions are: (1) why FI happened; (2) how national 
government and SNGs have interacted and how institutionalization has been devised; 
(3) how the outcomes can be interpreted in terms of socioeconomic development.
The qualitative methodology is adopted in that it can describe phenomena in contexts 
and explore dynamic processes and find sequential patterns, which is relevant for the 
objective of this thesis. The specific methodology is interdisciplinary approach 
combining case, history, policy process, and institution approach.
The main findings are; (1) democratization and globalization are the main driving 
factors of FI. (2) The policy process became more plural with the resistance against FI. 
As outputs, the institutionalization of intergovernmental relation is low and the fiscal 
measurements are mainly intergovernmental transfer, rather than tax transfer. (3) As 
outcomes of FI, SNG has high expenditure and intergovernmental transfer with weak 
tax revenue. Although the expenditure in social sector increased, it is attributed to the 
control of national government. In regional society, FI decreased regional disparity but 
the regional gap of income social protection expenditure became larger. Cross-country 
comparison tells that Korea needs more social investment through further FI.
Keywords: Decentralization, Fiscal decentralization, Republic of Korea
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1. INTRODUTION
The topic of this study is the fiscal decentralization in Republic of Korea known as 
South Korea (hereafter Korea). Decentralization is a world-wide trend. Not only Korea 
but also many countries around the world have commonly introduced and implemented
decentralization in order to satisfy ‘the pressure for greater democracy and meet the 
increasing demands of local citizens’ (Jones and Yokoyama 2005, 4).
Meanwhile, decentralization has diversity in that the driving effects, scopes, and 
contexts of decentralization in each country are so various and complex (Boadway and 
Shah 2009, 122-3). This is the main reason why various academic fields such as 
sociology, politics, economics, and public administration have dealt with 
decentralization. Overall theoretical arguments have focused on why decentralization
happens, how its process develops, and what its impact is. Empirical arguments have 
mainly dealt with whether or not decentralization has positive relation with dependent 
variables such as economic growth, social welfare. Current literatures point out that ‘the 
outcomes of decentralization on governance will depend on many country-specific 
social, cultural, political, and other institutional factors’ (Rodden et al. 2003, 6).
Fiscal decentralization as a redistribution of limited resources between national and 
sub-national government (SNG) has important implication theoretically as well as 
practically. First, it is the core of various decentralization policies in that full political 
and administrative autonomy of SNG can be realized by its sufficient fiscal capacity. 
Some principles such as efficiency, equity, and stability should be considered in order to 
introduce fiscal decentralization. Secondly, it is essentially political in that various 
political interests and actors are involved in it. Some actors, mainly most SNGs demand 
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more fiscal decentralization. On the other hand, some actors, mainly most central
ministries, hesitate or even protest against fiscal decentralization with fear that it can 
deprive them of their powers and resources which guarantee their organizational identity. 
Therefore, in the process of fiscal decentralization, it is crucially important to 
institutionalize the harmonization of explicit or potential confronting interests 
systemically in order to eliminate or reduce inefficiency which may be caused through 
unfair or meager arrangement. That is why most countries institutionalize 
intergovernmental relation in various norms such as constitution or acts. Meanwhile, 
institutionalization itself reflects the result of comprise between political actors as well 
as various contextual factors of each country such as historical legacies or social and 
economical identities. Fiscal decentralization, once institutionalized, can affect SNGs 
directly due to reformation of their administration and finance. Moreover, it can impact
regional society through the change of public service provisions.
1.1. Research Problem
Korea has experienced significant political and economic changes since its 
foundation in 1945. From ‘one of the poorest countries in the world with poor resource 
endowment,’ it dramatically changed into the 13th largest economy in the world, 
accomplishing full democracy in 1987.1 In order to consolidate democracy in regional
revel, decentralization has been adopted by political leaders and implemented through 
various institutional and fiscal measurements. Recently, decentralization policy has 
provided SNGs with much more resources such as political, administrative and fiscal 
competency than before democratization. Most SNGs, however, are still claiming more 
                                           
1 U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm
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fiscal resources. 
With such implication and various contexts of fiscal decentralization, the research 
problem of this thesis is mainly about the political and fiscal tensions between SNGs
and national government. Major concerns are, through the process of decentralization, 
why decentralization happened, how national government and SNGs have interacted, 
what how institutionalization has been devised, and how the outcomes can be
interpreted in terms of socioeconomic development.
1.2. Research Objective and Questions
The objective of this study is to assess the process of decentralization in Korea in its
contexts since 1987. Not only the public policy process in which related political actors 
participate under various institutions, but also the effects of decentralization on regional 
society are focused. On the base of the research objective, research questions are
discussed as below:
1.What are the main driving factors of fiscal decentralization in Korean government
since 1987?
2.What are the characteristics of successive Korean governments in terms of policy 
process and what are the outputs in institutional and fiscal aspect since 1987?
3.What are the outcomes of fiscal decentralization in SNG and regional society in the 
prospects of economic and social development in Korea since 1987?
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1.3. Methodology and Data Collecting
1.3.1. Methodology
The research methodology needs to be applied to fit for the purpose of research. In 
this study, mainly qualitative methodologies are applied in that they can ‘describe, in 
rich detail, phenomena as they are situated in contexts’ and ‘explore dynamic processes 
and find sequential patterns’ by qualitative methodology (Fischer, Miller, and Sidney
2007, 424). In this thesis, among various qualitative methodologies, more appropriate 
methodology is applied according to each of research parts. 
Case Approach
A case study may be understood as ‘the intensive study of a single case where the 
purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases’
(Gerring 2007, 20). The thesis itself is the case study of Korea which can provide 
meaningful implications in that it is still transmitting from a developing country where 
decentralization often failed, to a developed country. 
Historical Approach
Historical research is a tool to ‘analyze historical sequences and processes over time’
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 12). It is applied to the process and development of 
fiscal decentralization policy through successive governments in order to find out 
certain characteristics of each government.
Public policy Approach
Public policy analysis is concerned with ‘understanding and analyzing the whole 
process of public policy in terms of contexts, agenda setting, decision making, and
implementation’ (Hudson and Lowe 2004, 3). In this study, decentralization is mainly 
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understood by one of public policies. Therefore, by public policy analysis, the process 
and outcomes of decentralization can be explained appropriately (Knoepfe et al 2007, 33).
Institutional Approach
In order to assess the interaction between institutions and political actors, institutional 
approach is also necessary. In this study, institution as ‘the humanly devised constraints 
that structure human interaction’ includes informal institutions such as conventions as 
well as formal institutions. Informal institutions can not be easily transformed due to its 
rigidity, compared with formal institutions (Chavance 2009, 45). Particularly, it is 
focused on how institutional framework as ‘a mixed bag of institutions’ condition 
related actors and organizations and how they react against this.
1.3.2. Data Collecting
In this study, data are extracted from the relevant literatures such as internet sources or
print sources. Relevant data are also collected by secondary sources such as political 
documents, social and economic indicators, legal norms, statistics of related 
organizations such as Korea statistic office, and media data
1.4. The Outlines of Thesis
Following Chapter 2 introduces theoretical backgrounds of fiscal decentralization and
devises the conceptual framework for analysis. Based on the conceptual framework, 
following chapters assess the major aspects of fiscal decentralization. Chapter 3 and 4 
provide the contexts, institutions and organizations which are related to fiscal 
decentralization. Chapter 5 discusses the policy process of decentralization, focusing on 
the characteristics of process and outputs. In Chapter 6, the empirical results about the 
outcomes of decentralization are presented.
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2. THEORTICAL BACKGROUND
2.1. The Concept of Fiscal Decentralization
Literally, decentralization is ‘a process of transferring power to popularly elected 
local governments’ (U.S. AID 2000, 6). And it also is a multi-dimensional concept in 
that it is ‘the assignment of fiscal, political and administrative responsibilities to lower 
levels of government’ (Litvack et al 1998, 4). Most literatures categorize 
decentralization as three aspects: political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization
(Kim, 2008, 4). Political decentralization can be similar to local democracy, guaranteed
by constitution and laws, whereby chiefs and council members of SNGs are elected by 
their residents. Administrative decentralization indicates that SNGs have authorities of
their spending activities even if most taxes are raised nationally. Fiscal decentralization
focuses on the authorities of SNGs to fund their own revenues and spend them without 
any control of national government. In practice, however, fiscal decentralization is a 
problem of the extent in that even most developed countries share fiscal authorities with 
SNGs (Blöchliger 2006, 33). Such multidimensional aspect of decentralization suggests
an implication in that it can ‘affect a wide range of issues such as service delivery to 
macroeconomic stability’ (Litvack et al 1998, 30).
Three varieties of fiscal decentralization may be distinguished, corresponding to the 
degree of independent decision-making exercised at the local level (Bird and 
Vaillancourt 1998, 3). First, deconcentration means the dispersion of responsibilities
within a national government to regional branch offices. Second, delegation refers to a
situation in which SNGs act as agents for the national government, executing certain 
functions on its behalf. Third, devolution refers to a situation in which not only
implementation but also the authority to decide what is done is devolved to SNGs.
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2.2. The Background of Fiscal Decentralization
The gradual decentralization of fiscal responsibilities from national government to
SNGs has been a common theme in many countries. Although the process has differed 
and reflected each institutional, political, and historical feature, there are some common 
factors that drive fiscal decentralization (Boadway and Shah 2009, 59-60).
2.2.1. Democratization
According to Huntington (1993, 7), democracy exist when ‘most powerful collective 
decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which 
candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is 
eligible to vote’. He also defined a wave of democratization as ‘a group of transitions 
from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time 
and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period 
of time.’ Democratization involves ‘the end of an authoritarian regime; the installation 
of a democratic regime; and the consolidation of the democratic regime’ (Huntington 
1993, 34). There have been three waves of democratization in world history. The current 
wave, namely the third wave occurred since mid- 1970s in Portugal and has dispersed 
around all round world (Huntington 1993, 15).
Such democratization implicates the declining credibility of the centralized state
(Litvack et al 1998 4). The national government’s declining credibility was mainly 
attributed to economic failure (Sharma 2004, 5). Consequently, such political changes 
have local demands and local communities more important (Litvack et al 1998, 4). The 
logic that decisions made at the local level better reflects the resident’s need has been a 
common assumption for more fiscal decentralization (Ahmad and Tanzi 2007, 17).
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2.2.2. Globalization
The second background is the enormous pressure arising from globalization, 
accompanied by rapidly emerging developing economies and the revolution in 
communications. Globalization is related to decentralization in an ambiguous way: on 
the one hand, in many countries decentralization has been introduced due to the need for 
more flexible and adaptable decision-making (Jun and Wright 1996, 4). On the other 
hand, the competitive pressure globalization has produced has led to ‘individualization, 
atomization, and a loss of solidarity’ (Stohr, Edralin, and Mani 1996, 7).
2.2.3. International Agencies and Paradigms for Decentralization
Besides megatrends such as democratization, globalizations, real actors with ideology
for decentralization have had some countries (particularly developing or transitional 
countries) implement decentralization as one of important public policies implicitly or 
explicitly. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank 
(WB) are the crucial forces working behind the trend (Sharma 2004, 11). The main 
norms which IMF and WB follow implicitly may be ‘Washington Consensus’ which is 
known for its distrusting in national governments’ capacity and supporting
decentralization of state power (Sharma 2004, 5).
Meanwhile, in most of developed countries, decentralization has also been adopted as 
one of public policies, supported by the New Public Management (NPM) as one of the 
dominant paradigms for public management across the world, which advocates
managerial autonomy by reducing national agency controls. The WB or the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are also important
advocates of the NPM reforms across the world (McLaughlin et al. 2002, 181).
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2.3. The Process of Decentralization
How is decentralization devised or implemented? In this part, three approaches are 
introduced: functional, institutional, and policy approach. First, functional approach 
focuses on functional assignment such as expenditure or revenue between governments
and fiscal principles. Secondly, institutional approach focuses on institutional setting or 
incentives for decentralization. Finally, policy approach focuses on the policy sequences 
of devising and implementing decentralization. 
2.3.1. Functional Approach
Much of the literature on decentralization reflects fiscal federalism which is defined 
as ‘a system whose purpose is to permit different groups living in various states to 
express different preferences for public services; and this, inevitably, leads to 
differences in the levels of taxation and public services.’ (Ahmad and Brosio 2006 6-8).
Driven by the Musgravian principles of efficiency, equity, and stability, it is concerned 
with assigning expenditure responsibilities, raising revenues and designing 
intergovernmental transfers (Kim 2008, 11-16). Expenditure functions should be 
assigned first. Assignment of expenditure functions can broadly follow the subsidiarity 
principle which means that ‘process and decisions which can best be performed at local 
or regional levels should be executed there and only those which cannot be satisfactorily 
performed at these levels should be delegated to higher levels’ (Stohr, Edralin, and Mani
1996, 5).
Once expenditure functions are determined, revenues should be assigned to different 
levels of government to ensure that services can be financed and there are no unfunded 
mandates. Local revenues will come from a combination of intergovernmental transfers 
and local taxes. The transfers should address both vertical imbalances and horizontal 
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inequities, but assigning at least minimal tax instruments to local levels is an important 
part of accountability. The combination of transfers and taxes should cover local 
recurrent expenditures. Sub-national borrowing should serve as the last source of 
finance for the capital budget (Litvack et al 1998, 15). Such functional approach 
provides theoretical and normative standards for assessing the structure of one country, 
particularly in terms of financial principles. It has, however, some limitation in that its 
‘functional’ approach which means non-historical or non-contextual can have some 
difficulty when finding out why certain decentralization happened in certain country.
2.3.2. Institutional Approach
Institutions as ‘the informal or formal rules of the game in society’ provide incentives 
and constraints that influence human behavior (Ahmad and Tanzi 2007, 17).
Organizations are made up of ‘groups of individuals bound by some common project to 
achieve objectives’ (Chavance 2009, 51). Organizations and institutions influence each 
other. The institutional framework conditions the type of organization that will be 
created. On the other, the organizations also try to change the institutions (Chavance
2009, 51).
According to Litvack et al (1998), five institutional factors that shape the design of 
decentralization and influence its economic outcomes: the regulatory framework such as 
keeping the fiscal and financial system separate, the organization of service delivery
such as distinguishing between public delivery of services and public financing of 
services, information systems on finance of SNGs and competition which guarantee
accountability for citizens, the potential for asymmetric decentralization, and the need 
for policy synchronization. Taken together with the traditional functional perspective of 
public finance, these factors reflect an approach to decentralization that is based on the 
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design of institutional incentives and rules of governance as instruments for better 
economic management (Ahmad and Tanzi 2007, 16). 
2.3.3. Policy Approach
Bahl and Jorge (2006) suggest the ‘six steps’ of implementing decentralization. Their 
model is a normative approach to sequencing fiscal decentralization based on case 
studies of several countries (Bahl and Jorge 2006, 3). As a result, it can provide a 
relevant framework for decentralization policy process in other countries. 
The actual fiscal decentralization process begins with a national debate involving the 
key stakeholders. The second step is the design of the fiscal decentralization program by
a policy paper. Step three is to draft and pass the decentralization law(s). Step four is to 
adopt a set of implementing regulations that prescribe the detailed procedure of 
implementation. Step five is implementation, which involves a multitude of tasks. Step 
six involves feedback which monitors, evaluate outcomes (Bahl and Jorge 2006, 3-5).
They also analyze the related actors. There are three types of actors according to each 
actor’s interest or role: supports, detractors and ambivalent actors. Supports for 
decentralization are voters, elected politicians such as president and parliament, and 
external donors and advisors such as the WB. Most of ministries such as the Ministry of 
Finance, Economy, and other ministries could be significant detractors in that they 
commonly advocate central discretion except the Ministry of Home affairs which 
usually regulate SNGs but can also be an advocator for decentralization. SNGs usually 
favor fiscal decentralization, but the rich and poor will have very different opinions 
about the detailed. The more well-off local areas will favor increased fiscal discretion 
and the poor will prefer a redistributive system which guarantees their revenue stably.
(Bahl 1999, 18-20).
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2.4. The Outcomes of Fiscal Decentralization
The outcome of fiscal decentralization is so-called ‘a debate about the costs and 
benefits of decentralization’ (Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003, 3). It is about 
whether or not fiscal decentralization affects positively on dependent variables such as 
economic growth or social welfare. Various normative and empirical literatures have
tried to assess the relationship between decentralization and socio-economic variables. 
2.4.1. Theoretical Arguments For Fiscal Decentralization
Supporters argue that fiscal decentralization will lead to decisions that reflect local 
needs and preferences better and thus improve efficiency, as long as externalities and 
economies of scale are tolerable. However, the assumptions are different. The scholars
of fiscal federalism such as Musgrave, Samuelson assume that governments are run by 
‘benevolent policy makers’ who intend to maximize the welfare of their communities
(Ahmad and Brosio 2006, 6-8). Therefore, government failures cannot derive from 
pursing their personal interest, but only from lack of expertise and knowledge (Rodden, 
Eskeland, and Litvack 2003, 3). 
Even selfish governments, however, would efficiently provide public goods with 
vertical and horizontal competition if residents are free to move to the jurisdiction that 
best provides to their preferences by Tiebout’s ‘voting with one’s feet’ (Boadway and 
Shah 2009, 35). Otherwise, if national government is restricted to implement policies 
uniformly, small jurisdictions are more efficient since denationalized government can 
then differentiate policies among jurisdictions by Oates’ ‘decentralization theorem’
(Boadway and Shah 2009, 5)
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2.4.2. Theoretical Arguments Against Fiscal Decentralization
Arguments against decentralization are based mainly on the irrelevances of 
assumptions of pro-decentralization arguments by focusing on the costs of 
decentralization. Uncorrected externalities such as horizontal or vertical externalities 
would undermine decentralization (Boadway and Shah 2009, 29). The one example of 
vertical fiscal externalities is the soft budget constraint problem when SNGs believes 
that the national government will accommodate and share SNG’s excessive 
expenditures (Fischer, Miller and Sidney 2009, 5). Fiscal decentralization might also 
fail due to other costs such as information costs which would arise if oppositions and 
media at more junior levels of governments are weaker than at higher levels or 
coordination costs would arise by spillover effects (Ahmad and Tanzi 2007, 1-2). 
2.4.3. Conditional Arguments on Fiscal Decentralization
Conditional arguments on decentralization focus on the conditions under which 
decentralization enhances or undermines efficiency and accountability, and emphasize 
the incentives resulting from political and other institutions (Rodden, Eskeland, and 
Litvack 2003, 6). It is not important weather decentralization itself works or not. Rather 
pre-conditional factors are more important and should be studied (Litvack et al 1998, 3,
26). If conditions for decentralization are insufficient particularly in developing 
countries, decentralization would aggravate situation. The insufficient conditions can be 
the lack of SNG’s capacity, resident’s information and pressure on SNGs, civic cultural 
tradition, and fiscal equalities among regions (Khan and Hildreth 2004, 169-70).
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2.5. Conceptual Framework
In previous chapter, the driving factors, process, and outcomes of decentralization are 
discussed theoretically. In this part, after assessing related literatures on Korean 
decentralization, a conceptual framework is designed for the research problem. 
2.5.1. Literatures on Decentralization in Korea
It can be said that there are two main streams of study on decentralization in Korea
(Table 1). One is the study about how decentralization affect on various aspects such as 
economic growth, regional income or welfare policy. Another is the study about how 
decentralization has developed on base of qualitative methods. Although they 
commonly provide significant implications theoretically, missing from them is holistic, 
historical and policy approach which is necessary to assess the process and outcomes of 
fiscal decentralization.
Table 1 Examples of Korean Literature on Fiscal Decentralization
Source: Author
Literature Focus Method Argument (Contents)
Yijaeeun (2002) The local tax reform for decentralization Descriptive
It is necessary to introduce the 
local income tax and local 
consumption tax for enhancing the 
real local autonomy
Osung Kwon 
(2002)
The effects of fiscal 
decentralization on public 
spending
Regression 
analysis
Fiscal decentralization may play a 
role in improving the fit between 
provision of public goods and 
citizens’ demand in Korea
Euijune Kim, 
Sung Woong 
Hong, Soo Jung 
Ha (2003)
The Impact of decentralization 
on regional income disparity in 
Korea
Regression 
analysis
The regional income fluctuated 
until the early 1980s but stabilized 
during the 1990s.
Choi, Ho-Young 
(2004)
Comparing the characters of 
decentralization in the ‘National 
Government ’and in the 
‘Participatory Government’
Second 
literature 
review
Describing the types, scopes and 
methods of decentralization
Hyun-A Kim 
(2006)
The impact of decentralization 
on the growth of regional 
income.
Regression 
analysis
From 1990 to 2003, a significant 
positive relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and growth 
in Korea.
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2.5.2. Conceptual Framework Setting
The theoretical approaches to fiscal decentralization which are introduced above have 
strengths and weakness in that each approach mainly focus on certain aspect of fiscal 
decentralization. Therefore, in order to assess the development of decentralization, in 
this study, a combined policy analysis model is devised. Framing the political process as 
a continuous process of policy-making allowed assessing the cumulative effects of the 
various actors that interact in the policy process and shape its outcomes (Fischer, Miller 
and Sidney 2007, 44). In this model (Figure 1), important analytic aspects are 
contextual factors, policy process, and actors. In terms of Easton’s input-output model, 
contextual factors work as inputs. Policy cycle and political actors work in process. 
Outcomes work as outputs. 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework
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Contextual factors work as broad issues that shape driving factors of fiscal 
decentralization in political, economic, social and regional aspect. Secondly, institutions 
are formal or informal norms legitimizing decentralization (Litvack et al 1998, 16).2
Public sector consists of national and sub-national level actors. According to Fischer et 
al. 2007, 53), a policy is implemented by policy process which consists of sequential 
stages as:
 Agenda-setting as a certain demand is selected for public action
 Policy-making as transforming the demand as a set of objectives and 
measurements
 Implementation as the enforcement of the policy
 Feedback as appraising outcomes against intended objectives.
Actors are organizations or individuals whose authorities are prescribed by institutions
(Knoepfel, Varone, and Hill 2007, 41). They represent their interests with the resources 
under the institutional context that influences their individual and collective behavior
(Knoepfel, Varone, and Hill 2007, 39). A fiscal decentralization impacts on SNGs 
directly by redistributing financial structure and process of SNGs and society and 
regions by influencing social and economical situations. It also can yield unintended
outcomes or side-effects. 
                                           
2 Of course, some formal or informal norms can legitimize anti-decentralization reversely.
２８
3. THE CONTEXTS OF DECENTRAZITION IN KOREA
In this part, the contexts of decentralization in Korea are assessed on the base of 
historical approach. The contexts function as driving factor of decentralization policy. 
As discussed in the background of decentralization, democratization and globalization 
are also broad issues which shape the demands for decentralization in Korea (Hudson
and Lowe 2004, 6). However, in this part, the contextual factors are assessed according 
to main sectors: politics, economics, societies and regions in order to find more detailed 
mechanism. 
The modern Korean history can be divided by before and after 1987, in that the full 
democracy was accomplished in institutional perspective in 1987. The 1987 
democratization is a major event when there was a switchover from an authoritarian
system to a democratic system. Therefore, it is noteworthy that how Korean societies
changed before and after 1987 which is as a diverging point (Huh 2001, 9).
3.1. Politics
The characteristic of Korean politics can be represented as a continuing process of 
democratization and consolidating it. Although Western styled democratic institutions 
had been introduced and adapted before 1987, the reality was often ‘president-centric, 
with the undemocratic dictatorship at the apex of authoritarian bureaucracy’ (Park 2008).
Before 1987
According to Huntington (1993, 18), after the Second World War, a second wave of 
democratization which was promoted by allied occupation through the inauguration of 
democratic institutions in Korea in 1948. The First Republic under the first president 
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Rhee Syngman, who undermined democracy in late 1950s, was toppled in 1960 by the 
Student Revolution. The Second Republic did not last long, ending with the military 
coup by Park Chung Hee on May 16, 1961 (Kil and Moon 2001, 34). This new ‘semi-
authoritarian’ regime was legitimated by election in 1963 but abruptly changed itself as 
‘a full-scale highly authoritarian system’ in 1973 (Huntington 1993, 20)
During the third wave of democratization, confronting explosive protest movement of 
Korean citizens demanding democracy, the despotic government yielded proclaiming a 
plan for democratization including a direct presidential election and the resumption of 
local autonomy (Huh 2001, 9).
After 1987
In 1987 the authoritarian government submitted Roh Tae-wo as its candidate for 
president and he won (Huntington 1993, 23). Roh government had formal legitimacy
but Roh’s former military career and strong opposition parties made his government 
impotent. In 1993, Kim young-sam took presidency as the first non-militant by direct 
election since 1960s. His government attributed to consolidating democracy by radical 
reforms such as depoliticizing the military but suffered a serious shortage of foreign 
exchange in 1997. In 1998, Kim Dae-jung government, which is inaugurated by the first 
peaceful turnover of political power from ruling conservative party to an opposition, 
succeeded in leading Korea out of financial crisis. Kim Dae-jung’s successor, Roh Moo-
hyun endeavored to dismantle the old authoritarian structure dominated by bureaucratic 
elites, corporate power and the rich on the basis of popular participation (Park, 2008). 
His radical reforms, however, was often frustrated by the opposition party or interest 
groups. As Lee Myung-bak followed Roh, his political party, the oppositional party 
during Kim dae-jung’s and Roh mu-haeon’s government, became the ruling party again 
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in 10 years. Although there were some political or economical unrest after 
democratization, it is apparent that in Korea, democracy has been consolidating since 
1987 by fair, democratic and periodic elections without any halt of constitution. 
3.2. Economy
Korea has undertaken economic development in earnest since 1962. Over the period 
from 1970 to 2007, the average growth rate of Korea went over 4%. In the second half 
of the 1990s, Korea also experienced high rates of growth in GDP per capita (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Growth in GDP per capita as Percentage change, annual rate (Unit: %)
Source: OECD
Before 1987
Korea could achieve outstanding economic growth by launching ‘a state-led and 
outward-oriented strategy for development’ (Burnell and Randall 2005, 503). While the 
Western styled market system was adopted as the principle of the economy, government
intervention facilitated its effective growoth (Kil and Moon 2001, 15). Such strategy, 
however, caused a concentration of economic power in the chaebols. By 1997, 
production portion of ‘thirty’ chaebols accounted for ‘40’ per cent of total 
manufacturing (OECD 2001, 32).
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After 1987
Political democratization was followed by economical democratization. Korean 
people did not want “rapid growth at any cost” any more and demanded for better 
welfare and higher wages (OECD 2001, 32). Globalization also deeply impacted 
economy through the Uruguay Round (1994) and joining the OECD in 1995 (OECD 
2001, 32). The integration with world economy, however, revealed some weakness of 
Korean economy, confronting financial crisis in late 1997.
3.3. Society
Before 1987
While the economic growth raised income and the standard of living, the public 
welfare was relatively weak compared with economy. Instead, ‘the informal, private and 
family welfare system’ functioned as the substitute of public welfare (OECD 2001, 175).
Korean people thought that ‘supporting industrial and agricultural production would 
generate the income to support the needy, and relied upon the family for distribution’
(Burnell and Randall 2005, 507).
After 1987
Such economic priority, however, caused serious inequality between classes and 
regions since late 1980s. Particularly, the financial crisis made Korean people realize
that ‘economic development cannot be socially sustainable without social policy 
measures’ (OECD 2001, 175). As a result, the policy emphasis shifted to promoting 
welfare and enhancing equality, which led to the legislation of the Minimum Wage Act 
(1986), the Equal Employment Act (1987) and the Act on Employment Promotion and 
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Vocational Rehabilitation for the Disabled (1990) as well as other measures.3 In the 
early 1990s, in order to systematically cope with unemployment problems caused by a 
slowdown in economic growth, Korean Government passed several major laws, 
including the Employment Insurance Act (1993), the Basic Employment Policy Act 
(1995) and the Vocational Training Promotion Act (1997), setting a foundation for 
employment policies.4 After the financial crisis in 1997, the Government strengthened 
the social safety net to cope with unemployment by extending the coverage of 
employment insurance to all workers, including part-time and temporary workers
(1999). Individual Action Plans (IAPs) for recipients of unemployment benefits have 
been also expanded to cover both young people and the elderly as a means of 
encouraging them to look for jobs more actively.5
3.4. Regions
One of the most distinguishing characteristics in Korea’s regional aspect is spatial 
disparities between regions. The Capital Region which consists of Seoul, Korean capital
city and its neighbor SNGs, Incheon and Gyonggi, has more than 21 million residents, a 
little less than a half of the total population. The number is considerably large when 
comparing to figures with other OECD countries such as Japan, France, and England, 
whose population share of the capital region are 31.9 %, 18.5 %, and 11.8 % 
respectively (Lee 2007, 2-3). The capital region also increased its share of 
manufacturing employment in the 1960s and peaked in 1975, with 48.3 percent (Huang 
and Boocchi 2009, 324-5). The over-concentration of the population in the Capital 
Region is attributed to the remarkably fast economic growth and government’s 
                                           
3 The official website of Korea. http://www.korea.net
4 Ibido
5 Ibido
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unbalanced regional development strategy since the 1960s (Lee 2007, 2-3).
Such spatial disparities were inevitable in early stage of economic development; 
however, they have caused serious economic and social problems, although the 
authorities have endeavored to mitigate the disparities through redistribution policies in 
industry, education and administration. 
3.5. Interim Conclusion
Before 1987, Korea was mainly state, economy, and center-led countries. Without 
sufficient resources or capitals, it might be an inevitable alternative. Such uneven 
structure between center and peripheral regions, and economic priority yielded 
outstanding economic growth during short period. However, after 1987, 
democratization and globalization demanded the old regime to be more democratic and 
open to global market. This means that national government’s role weakened and other 
actors including SNGs who had been subordinate began to claim their rights.
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4. INSTUTITUTIONS AND ACTORS (ORGANIZATIONS)
In this part, the current institutions and organizations of decentralization in Korea are 
assessed. Institutions as the rules of the game in society provide the incentives and 
constraints for actors (Litvack et al 1998, 16). Under such institutional constraints and 
incentives, Actors cooperate and confront yielding outcomes of decentralization. 
4.1. Institutions
4.1.1 Formal Institutions
The Korean legislative system consists of the Constitution as the paramount law, Acts 
to realize the constitutional notions, and administrative legislation including Presidential 
Decrees, Ordinances of Ministries and so forth to effectively implement the Acts.6
Constitution
The principles for the autonomy and the structure of sub-national governments are 
stated in the Constitution. It states in two articles under the title of “Local Autonomy”:
 Article 117: (1) Sub-national governments shall deal with administrative matters
pertaining to the welfare of local residents, manage properties, and may enact
provisions relating to local autonomy, within the limit of Acts and subordinate
statutes. (2) The types of sub-national governments shall be determined by Act.
 Article 118: (1) A sub-national government shall have a council. (2) The
organization and powers of local councils, and the election of members; election
procedures for heads of all governments; and other matters pertaining to the
organization and operation of sub-national governments shall be determined by
Act.
                                           
6 Korea Legislation Research Institute website (http://elaw.klri.re.kr)
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The Constitution, however, does not give autonomous and general decision making 
authority to SNGs. The national government departments hold substantial prerogative 
regarding the distribution of competences. The amount of autonomy enjoyed by SNGs
depends, according to the Local Autonomy Act, on the power conferred on them by the 
Statutes, or Presidential Decree (PCGID 2007, 133).
Acts on fiscal decentralization
Several Acts reified the Constitution as below (Lienert and Jung 2004, 291):
 The Local Autonomy Act 1945, as the basic Act of SNGs, defines the structure
and functions of SNGs. It also regulates the operation of local governments and 
the basic relationships between the national and SNG
 The Local Tax Act 1949 defines the tax bases and standard rates for local taxes.
 The Local Finance Act 1963 provides SNGs with autonomous budget procedures.
 The Local Share Tax Act 1961 and the National Treasury Subsidies Act 1963 
govern intergovernmental fiscal relationship. 
 The Educational Local Share Tax Act 1971 establishes a local educational share 
tax to be used exclusively for expenditures of local education unlike other OECD 
member countries
 The Special Act on Regional Balanced Development 2003, establishes a special 
fund for regional development.
4.1.2 Informal Institutions
In this part, political culture is dealt as a main informal institution in that it is more 
related to fiscal decentralization than others. Political culture can be defined as a 
patterned value system, composed of political ideology, ruling norms and political 
symbols, which influence the political systems and individual behaviors (An 2003, 18)
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One of the most significant political cultures in Korea is hierarchical authoritarianism 
which originated since Chosun dynasty. Even in modern history, with the exception of 
1960, South Korea was never able to escape from the grip of autocracy and 
authoritarianism for four decades (Kil and Moon 2001, 3). Another one is the 
centralistic bureaucratic state. Under authoritarian rule, an effectual system of checks 
and balances did not exist. The executive branch has always prevailed over the 
legislative and judiciary branches. This severely damaged democratic political processes 
by excluding the citizens (Kil and Moon 2001, 3-4). Therefore, local autonomy is 
relatively new concept to the Korean society (OECD 2001, 64). Compared to formal 
institutions, informal institutions such as political culture easily do not change
(Chavance 2009, 51). Even after democratization, many bureaucrats of national
ministries still regard SNGs as their subordinates.
4.2. Main Actors
4.2.1. President
Korea has a presidential system, in which the President is the head of State. The 
Constitution states that executive power is vested in the executive branch headed by the 
President (Art. 66) (Kil and Moon 2001, 289). The President, elected by nationwide, 
equal, direct and secret ballot, stands at the apex of the executive branch. The President 
is also the chief administrator who enforces the laws passed by the legislature while 
issuing orders and decrees for the enforcement of laws.7 The President serves a single 
five-year term, with no additional terms being allowed. This single-term provision is a 
safeguard for preventing any individual from holding the presidential power, which is 
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due to the long history of dictatorships whereby all most decisions were made by the 
President as a single (Kim 1997, 146).
However, such single-term provision often yields side-effects. Korean presidents 
have little time or impetus for consensus building or compromise because they're forced 
from the inauguration to focus on legacy issues, not re-election (Lee 2008). Moreover, it
may create a ‘lame-duck phenomenon,’ which could later diminish reform efforts and 
bureaucrats’ compliance (Kim 2000, 91).
4.2.2. Prime Minister and Ministers
The Constitution establishes the State Council as the highest decision making orgn in 
the executive (Art. 88) (Kil and Moon 2001, 289). The State Council, whose head is the 
President, comprise the Prime Minister, Ministers, and deliberates on important fiscal 
policies that fall within the power of the executive including draft budgets, settlement of 
accounts (Art.89). 
National government organization, including ministries, are established and their 
roles are defined according to the provisions of the Government Organization Act 1948 
(GOA), as amended (Kil and Moon 2001, 289). As for local finance, the Ministry of 
Public Affairs and Security (MOPAS) is primarily responsible for local finance and 
administration (GOA, Art. 29). Other ministries are related to specific earmarked grants 
which are drafted and overseen by them. Local share tax as a non-earmarked grant8 and 
earmarked grants are finally approved by Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSA) in 
ministry level before submitting them to the State Council within the Executive branch 
(GOA, Art. 23).
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Local share tax Act. 
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According to Boadway and Shah Shah (2007), institutional arrangement for policy 
and administration of fiscal relations between different levels of government is crucial 
for creating a credible and stable fiscal system. Among four broad categories, Korea 
belongs to the ‘national/central government agency model,’ in that the MOPAS as a 
national agency assumes main responsibility for policy making and implementation for 
fiscal relations. However, despite of its formal authority, some of important fiscal 
decentralization policies were led by Presidential Commissions which were regarded as 
more impartial than the MOPAS.
4.2.3. The National Assembly and Political Parties
Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly, a unicameral legislature. In the 
authoritarian era, the National Assembly was a fairly weak form of marginal legislature 
with executive dominance in the legislative process. The legislature neither rejected 
executive proposals nor modified them to a significant extent with being called a 
‘handmaid’ of the executive (Norton and Ahmad 1999, 73). This is partly due to three 
decades of protracted authoritarian rule and partly due to the constitutional design of the 
presidential system (Kil and Moon 2001, 182).
However, democratic transition since 1987 have increased legislative oversight over 
executive branch and the division among three branches has become more clear and 
concrete (Kil and Moon 2001, 182). As for fiscal decentralization, the role of National 
Assembly is to monitor and approve the drafts of executive branch. 
The political parties of Korea were formed with very low institutionalization. The 
average life of Korean political parties has not been long. New ruling and opposing 
parties were formed with each change of regimes. They did not play a national role in 
politics (Hudson and Lowe 2004, 159). Under military dictatorship for thirty years, 
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ruling parties were no more than election organization or propaganda organization. 
Even after democratization, political parties are weak, divided along regional lines, and 
organized around cliques (Lim 2009, 93).
4.2.4. Sub-National Government
SNGs refer to ‘specific institutions or entities created to deliver a range of specified 
services to a relatively small geographically delineated area’ (Boadway and Shah 2009, 
3). Korea has multi-tiered governments based on a unitary constitution which places a 
greater premium on uniformity and equal access to public services than it does on 
diversity (Boadway and Shah 2009, 6).
Structure
There are basically two levels of SNGs in Korea.9 The provincial level includes the
Seoul Special Metropolitan City, and 6 other Metropolitan cities, and 9 Provinces
(Figure 3). 
Figure 3 Provinces and Metropolitan Cities
                                           
9 KRIA. http://www.krila.re.kr/english/?code=govern&subp=0201
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Source: modified from Huang and Bocchi (2009)
Metropolitan cities are urban areas separated from provinces, often former provincial 
capitals, after 1945, based on the rationale that the interests of urban areas are better 
served by their own governments. The municipalities below these provinces concern the 
municipal cities (Si), counties (Gun), and autonomous wards (JachiGu) which are 
governed by political representatives, who include mayors and council members (Figure 
4). These counties and municipal-level cities comprise various administrative sub-units: 
administrative wards (IlbanGu), towns (Eup), villages (Myeon), and neighborhood 
(Dong) according to demographic criteria. Authority for education is located in the 
Offices of Education in the provincial and metropolitan governments. 
Figure 4 Sub-national government Structure
Source: MOGAHA (2006)
Functions
The Local Autonomy Act lists the functions of the provinces and metropolitan city 
governments and the basic level governments. The tasks of the metropolitan and 
４１
provincial governments are characterized by the intermediary functions.10
On the base of the constitution and the Local Autonomy Act, the basic level 
governments handle autonomous affairs such as its organization and management, 
promotion of citizens’ welfare, industry promotion, and local development and 
management of facilities such as roads and water supply, etc. The national government 
is to maintain only a passive role in these autonomous affairs. 
Meanwhile, there are also delegated functions, which are entrusted either to SNGs or 
to local chief executives. Responsibilities delegated to SNGs, such as vaccinations and 
the maintenance of national roads and public health centers, are subject to specific laws
(Jones and Yokoyama 2005, 6). According to two complete surveys on the distribution 
of government’s affairs (Kim 2002, 1), the rate of national affairs and autonomous 
affairs is about 75:13 in 1994 and 73:15 in 2002 (Table 2) .
Table 2 Distribution of Administration Functions                       (Unit: number, %)
1994 2002
Total affairs 15,774 (100%) 41,603 (100%)
National affairs 11,744 (75%) 30,240 (73%)
Delegated or Shared functions* 1,920 (12%) 5,057 (12%)
Autonomous affairs 2,110 (13%) 6,306 (15%)
Note: Shared function* means functions that national, regional or local government share responsibilities
Source: the Presidential Committee of Promoting Devolution
Organizations of SNG
SNGs have both legislative and executive powers. Legislative power is the authority 
of local assemblies, and executive power is held by local chief executive and their 
subordinates (OECD 2001, 64).
Size of SNG
Korean municipalities appear to be remarkably large compared to other OECD 
countries although the average size of the lowest SNG unit varies considerably among 
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OECD Member countries (Table 3). 
Table 3 Lowest territorial units in OECD Member countries
Source: OECD (2001), OECD territorial reviews: Korea
Expenditure
In principle, the expenditure of autonomous functions is financed by SNG’s self 
revenue. Meanwhile, the expenditure of delegated functions is financed by earmarked 
grants, with the national authorities playing an active role in their implementation often 
restricting SNGs with strict and detailed standards (Jones and Yokoyama 2005, 6). 
Revenue
SNG’s budgets are composed of local (self) revenue and intergovernmental (local) 
transfer. Local revenue is composed of local taxes, local non-tax revenues and revenues 
from local bond issues. Intergovernmental transfer consists of Local share tax which is 
set at a fixed share of national tax revenue based on the Local Share Tax Act and 
earmarked grant based on the National Treasury Subsidies Act (Jones and Yokoyama
2005, 6).
Main Characteristics of Local Finance
Wide Fiscal Gap between SNGs
There is a wide variation in the financial capacity between SNGs. This is caused 
mainly by the concentration of population and industries on the Capital region and rural 
areas. This implies somewhat paradoxical situation of fiscal decentralization in Korea.
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According to the fiscal federalism, the ideal fiscal arrangement is to enhance tax 
autonomy. In Korean context, it is difficult in that it can aggravate the current regional 
disparity. 
A complex local tax system 
The local tax system, which has accounted for about 20% of total tax revenue in 
Korea during the past decade, is relatively complicated with 16 local taxes. A basic 
principle of Korea’s tax system is the separation of tax bases between national and 
SNGs to avoid excessive taxation on particular items (Jones and Yokoyama 2005, 11).
One of the earmarked taxes, the Local Education Tax, is a major revenue source. It was 
introduced in 2001 as a surcharge on five local taxes, but is transferred directly to local 
education governments and thus does not enhance the autonomy of local general 
governments. Property taxes account for about half of local tax revenue. However, taxes 
on consumption, business and personal income and social security and payroll taxes 
were relatively insignificant compared to other OECD countries (Jones and Yokoyama
2005, 11).
The limited use of tax-rate flexibility
Local Tax Act allows SNGs to adjust tax rates, by as much as 50% above or below 
the standard rate, for 11 of 16 local taxes. However, this power has been rarely used by 
SNGS. At the provincial/metropolitan city level, only four of 16 jurisdictions had 
changed a tax rate from its standard rate as of 2004, and only ten of the 250 lower level
SNGs. In contrast to the limited use of tax flexibility, SNGs grant tax reductions and 
exemptions as part of regional development policy. The limited use of tax-rate 
flexibility in Korea conflicts with the principles of fiscal federalism and the situation in 
some other OECD countries (Jones and Yokoyama 2005, 11). 
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Large intergovernmental transfers
Transfers from the national government fund another 40% of SNG expenditure. They 
thus play an extensive role in closing the gap between SNG spending responsibilities 
and revenue capacity, as well as narrowing the large variation in fiscal capacity between 
SNGs. Among these transfers, the largest is the Local Share Tax. National Subsidies, 
earmarked grants provide funds for a wide range of local public services. The Local 
Transfer Fund, a block grant fund was introduced in 1991 to promote balanced regional 
development and to supplement local investment (Jones and Yokoyama 2005, 17).
Associations of SNGs
Individual SNG has limit for communicating with national governments. Therefore, it 
is advantageous for SNGs to organize one organization to co-operate and communicate 
collectively with national government about matters of common interests (Kim 2004).
Currently, there are four associations of SNG: the Governors' Association of Korea, the
National Association of Mayor, the Association of Metropolitan and Provincial Council 
Chairs, the National Council Association of Chairmen. Such associations were
established based on Article 165 of the Local Autonomy Act. The role of the
Associations became larger due to their position linking national government and SNGs.
4.3. Interim Conclusion
The Constitution and related Acts guarantee local democracy that is political 
decentralization. The reality is, however, SNGs have not sufficient fiscal authorities. 
The asymmetric distribution of administrative affairs also shows the imbalanced 
intergovernmental relations. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the detailed process of 
decentralization in the following chapter to find out the origin of such problems.
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5. THE POLICY PROCESS OF DECENTRALIZATION
5.1. Before 1987
Contextual factors 
The contemporary challenge of the first republic (1948-60) was to build a new nation 
based on democracy including local democracy under the Constitution. However, the 
President Rhee Syngman’s desire for a prolonged one-man rule undermined democracy 
following severe protests of students and citizens. With the exception of the second 
republic (1960-1961), local democracy had halted for nearly 30 years by authoritarian 
governments. However, with the response to the demand of civil society for democracy, 
‘the Democratization and reform Declaration’ was announced by the ruling party in 
June 29, 1987. Together with direct presidential election system and strengthening all 
basic rights in the new constitution, local autonomy was also guaranteed (Oh 1999, 98-
100).
The characteristics of policy process
Highly Centralized Policy process
Authoritarian governments insulated the policy process from civil and political 
society. Although political parties and the parliament were set up as decision-making 
institutions, their influence over policy process has been fundamentally limited (Kil and 
Moon 2001, 180). Up until the early 1980s, government restructuring was imposed from 
above, mostly by specific political motivations of the ruling group apart from the 
general interests of the people. Reforms did not start from the bottom, and so failed to 
reflect social and economic developments of the Korean society and popular demands
(Kil and Moon 2001, 181).
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Hierarchical intergovernmental relation
Not only the participation of local residents but also that of SNGs are limited in the 
policy process which was ruled by national government. Considerations on local 
peculiarities for economic and social development are easily disregarded (Kil and Moon
2001, 190). The national government could not know the complex variety of factors that 
affected the success of programs and projects in local communities throughout the 
country. Rather, it increased the number of local branches of the national administration. 
This became a source of conflict between SNGs and national government that still 
remains today (Kil and Moon 2001, 181).
Policy Outputs
Institutional arrangement
Based on the Constitution, the Local Autonomy Act was enacted in 1949 and local 
councilors were elected by direct vote. Indirect election of the chief executives of lower-
tier local authorities was replaced by direct election through the Second Amendment in 
1956. In 1958, the Fourth Amendment substituted the direct election of local chiefs with
an appointment system, which is mainly due to the President Lee’s intention to control
all SNGs. The 2nd Republic (1960-61) passed the Fifth Amendment in 1960 so that 
both local chiefs and councilors were directly elected to realize the full fledged local 
autonomy. 
The military coup in 1961, however, suspended it abruptly. Since then, the system of 
local autonomy had been completely abolished and SNGs functioned as merely 
subordinates to national government. In order to control all regions and mobilize local 
resources for economic development, local administration system was transformed as 
centralized one. In 1961, the Local Autonomy Act was replaced with ‘the Provisional 
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Measures for Local Autonomy’ by which all local councils were dissolved and elected 
chiefs were fired. Instead, both governor and mayor were appointed by the president. 
The smallest units of local government, such as towns (Eup), villages (Myeon) and
neighborhoods (Dong), are excluded from the status of SNG eligible for self-
governance just remaining administrative organizations (Lee 2002, 13). That is why 
current Korean basic level governments are remarkably large compared to other OECD 
countries. It is problematic that particularly villages had been a natural community in 
rural area with which emotional identification of belongingness (Kim 1997, 154).
Unlike other OECD countries, the authorities of local education and police were seized 
by national government. 
An attached clause of the Yusin (Revitalization) Constitution, amended in 1972, even 
institutionalized the suspension of local assembly, stating that the local assembly should 
not be constructed until the reunification of Korean peninsula was achieved (Huh 2001, 
11). The Constitution of 5th Republic in 1981 was also provisional. Although it 
guaranteed local democracy , it stated in supplementary provision that ‘local councils 
shall be established on an incremental basis, taking into account the degree of local 
financial self-sufficiency’ (Kim 1997, 150).
Fiscal arrangement
Although halting local autonomy, the authoritarian regime enacted most of important 
fiscal Acts during their rules: the Local Share Tax Act 1961, the Local Finance Act 1963 
and the National Treasury Subsidies Act 1963. However, during the authoritarian regime, 
local finance became dependent on national government. Before 1963, local taxes were
mainly based on surtaxes on the national tax. By tax reform in 1963, local tax was 
separated from most general taxes such as income tax and value added tax which 
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became entirely allocated to the national government (Lee 2002, 15). As such 
measurements aggravated local finance; national government filled the fiscal gap by 
Local share tax.
5.2. From 1988 to 1992 (Roh Tae-wo government) 
Contextual factors 
Even though Roh Tae-wo won the presidential election in late 1987, the gap between 
other candidates was slight. In addition, his militant career which had been suspected 
that he was deeply involved in military coup of 1980 and bloody oppression of Kangju 
made his government’s legitimacy much weak even since the inauguration (Kleiner 
2001, 224). Furthermore, a few months after his inauguration, in the National Assembly 
election, the ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) holds 125 seats of the total 
299 seats (41.8%) and failed to hold the majority of seats, which was the first in the 
history of Korean politics.
The President, directly elected by the people, had to get along with a Parliament 
dominated by the opposition. After confronting seriously in the National Assembly, on 
January 1990, Roh announced that he reached an agreement with some opposition party 
leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil to join forces and merge the DJP, the Party 
for Reunification and Democracy and the New Democratic Republican Party into a new 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). The New Party, the DLP, had a two-thirds majority in 
the National Assembly (Kleiner 2001, 224). 
The characteristics of policy process
After democratization, the political arena transformed from the President and 
executive to the parliament and opposition parties. Meanwhile, the process of 
４９
decentralization did not smoothly proceed due to the conflicting political interests of 
each political party. The National Assembly had an obligation to enact a law to reify the 
local autonomy article of constitution amended in 1987. Moreover, throughout the 
presidential campaign in 1987 after democratization, the restoration of local autonomy 
was one of the biggest campaign pledges of the then-ruling party. However, the ruling 
party and the opposition parties did not agree the amendment of the Local Autonomy 
Act instantly, which retarded the institutionalization of decentralization. 
Policy Outputs
Institutional arrangement
On April 6, 1988, the government initiated a revision of the Local Autonomy Act. By 
the law, SNGs were no longer the branches of national government. In March 1991, the 
national government finally held a direct election for lower-level local council members. 
In June 1991, another election for upper-level local council members was held (Park 
2006, 85). However, the chief election was postponed due to the disagreement between 
political parties. ‘The Administrative Reform Commission’ which was established in 
1988 and it recommended decentralization preparing for local autonomy (Park 2006, 
85). ‘The joint committee for devolution’ was established in 1991 for the devolution of 
national government’s functions to SNGs. From 1991 to 1998, it deliberated 3,701 
affairs and decided 2,008 affairs to be devolved to SNGs. The committee, however, was 
not founded on law so its legal foundation was so weak and some ministries protested to 
devolve their affairs (Na 2004, 60). Although the formal initiatives of devolution were 
done by the demands of SNGs, the actual devolution was executed on base of the 
convenience or interest of central ministries. Sometimes SNGs protested to the 
devolutions which were not supported by fiscal arrangements (Park 2006, 85). 
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Fiscal arrangement
After democratic revolution in 1987, the national government altered the local tax 
system to enlarge local tax revenues. For instance, Tobacco Sales Tax was transferred
from national tax base to local tax base in December 1988. The immediate outcome of 
this change on local finance was that SNGs’ tax revenue share of total local revenues 
increased from 30% in 1988 to 39% in 1989. For other instances, a Horse-race Tax in 
1988, a Fire-fighting Facilities Tax in 1991, and a Regional Development Tax in 1991 
became part of the province tax base (transferred from county/city tax to province tax). 
Additionally, the amendment of Local Tax Act that was passed by the National 
Assembly in 1991 allowed SNGs to set tax rates within certain boundaries (usually 
plus/minus 50%). Before the pass of this Local Tax Act, the head of SNGs who 
attempted to alter tax rates must get approved by the minister of Ministry of Home 
Affairs. However, through the amendment of the Local Tax Act, SNGs became to have 
discretionary power to set tax rates by the decision of local assembly (Huh 2001, 64).
In 1991, the Local transfer fund Act was also enforced. The local transfer fund Act 
stipulates that a portion of certain national taxes will be entirely or partially 
redistributed to the local level (OECD 2001, 74).
5.3. From 1993 to 1997 (Kim young-sam government)
Contextual factors
During the presidential campaign in 1992, all candidates pledged themselves to
establish full-fledged local autonomy. Just before the local election date, June 27, 1995
which was set by the Law, some politicians especially in the ruling party tried to delay
the local election once again. But they could not go against the stream of the times (Kim 
1997, 155). The major tasks of the Kim Young-Sam Government are to root out the 
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legacy of the authoritarian state and to realize the goals of democratization. This 
involves devolving power to the lower levels of government, coupled with deregulation.
In addition, globalization began to sweep Korea. Kim government had to cope with 
the World Trade Organization framework and OECD membership requirements which 
were mainly financial liberalization and extending full local democracy.
Decentralization was conceived of as a composite policy response to the decreasing 
effectiveness of national control and intervention, economic and fiscal constraints, and 
growing claims for local democracy and citizen rights (Kim 2002, 1).
The characteristics of policy process
Democratization complicated governance in Korea. Explicit or implicit resistance 
from ministries poses a significant obstacle to the President’s efforts to implement his 
economic reforms fully. The resistance has come in various forms, including vested-
interest groups, bureaucratic inertia and institutional constraints. In fact, the most 
significant change in the policy process since democratization has been the growth of 
inter-ministerial conflicts. Democratization brought many new voices in political parties 
into the legislature. The lack of consensus among parties in the legislature and the 
divided government in the presidential system often led to the abandonment of reform 
measures (Lim 2009, 93). 
Policy Outputs
Institutional arrangement
The national government amended the Local Autonomy Act once more on March 16, 
1994 and held elections for both local council members and the chief executives in June 
1995. Though the chief executives and councilors were to be elected to a four-year term 
in 1995, the second local election was held in June 1998 for the arrangement of the 
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National Assembly election cycle. Local administrative heads of government are elected 
for a four-year term for a maximum of three terms (Huh 2001, 12).
Kim government did not institutionalize any organization exclusively for 
decentralization. The joint devolution committee for devolution’ which was established 
in 1991 continued to exist during Kim government. One of the most outstanding outputs 
in Kim government is the reform of reorganizing basic level SNGs, mainly the 
municipal cities (Si) and counties (Gun). In 1995, 41 cities and 39 counties were merged 
into 40 cities and the administrative areas for three Metropolitan cities were revised in 
order to reduce disparity by integrating urban and rural areas into the existing 
communities (OECD 2001, 79-80).
Fiscal arrangement
During Kim government, the revenue of Local transfer fund was extended and some 
rural development programs were added in order to prepare for the Uruguay Round 
Multilateral Negotiation in 1995 (Im 2003). Except the extension of the Local transfer 
fund, there were hardly any significant fiscal arrangements for local finance (Geum 
2009, 15). This could be explained partly because main fiscal arrangements were 
already set before Kim government.
5.4. From 1998 to 2002 (Kim Dae-Jung government)
Contextual factors 
The financial crisis in late 1997 forced Korea to seek a rescue loan from the IMF in 
November 1997. The IMF’s first step was to drastically reshape Korean economic 
policies. Kim Dae-Jung won the Presidential election in 1997 under the coalition 
between his party, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) and the United Liberal 
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Democrats (ULD) of Kim Jong-Pil who was the Prime minster of Park Chung-hee’s 
military government. Although there were ideological differences between them, Kim 
was the first Korean president elected from the opposition party in 50 years of modern 
Korean politics (Park 2008). 
Kim government planned to reform virtually every facet of society by focusing on 
four major sectors: finance, business, labor, and the public sector (Kim 2000, 82). In 
public sector, decentralization was adopted as one of national strategies (Park 2006, 
138). The rearrangement of the functions of national and SNGs was also adopted as one 
of ‘the 100 policy agenda’ of government (Kim 2002, 1).
The parliament, however, was not favorable to Kim. In April 1999 general election, 
the ruling party, the MDP did not get a legislative majority. Final results of the polls 
reported that the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP), previous ruling party
won 133 parliamentary seats, four seats short of a simple majority (44%), while the 
ruling MDP secured only 115 (38%). The main opposition GNP often attempted to slow
the pace of President Kim’s reform drives. Consequently, the ruling MDP will once 
again promote an alliance with the splinter opposition the ULD and use independents to 
press ahead with policy initiatives.
The characteristics of policy process
The objectives of public sector reforms of Kim government are similar with the NPM
trend whose paradigm is characterized such as devolving authority, developing 
competition and improving the quality of regulation in that Kim government had an 
ambitious administrative reform agenda designed to create a ‘smaller but more efficient 
government’ (Kim 2000, 82-3).
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At the National Assembly, the conflict between the small ruling party, the MDP and 
big opposition party, the GNP as well as the limitation of a coalition government 
between the MDP and the ULD made it difficult to pass important reform bills. In 
addition, ‘Lame-duck phenomenon,’ of one-term Presidency also diminished reform 
efforts and bureaucrats’ compliance (Kim 2000, 91).
Since 1995, some civil movement association asserted the necessity of special 
commission for decentralization such as ‘the Decentralization Commission’ in Japan. 
Kim Dae-Jung adopted such claim as one of major election pledges and established ‘the 
Presidential Committee of Promoting Devolution’. In March 2001, around one hundred 
and fifty civil movement organizations participated in pronouncing ‘the Declaration of 
Local Democracy.’ In September 2001, around thirty thousand intellectuals including 
professors participated in ‘the national intellectuals’ declaration for decentralization.’
Such movements were commonly based on the recognition that national government 
persistently resisted full decentralization despite of the constitution’s guarantee of local 
democracy so civil society should coerce national government to give up its vested 
interests (Kim 2000, 91).
Policy Outputs
Institutional Arrangements
In order to overcome the limitations of ‘the joint devolution committee for devolution
1991-1998)’, ‘the Presidential Committee of Promoting Devolution’ was newly 
established based on ‘the Act on Promoting Devolution’ which was enforced in 1998. 
This committee has decision-making authority for devolution to enforce ministries to 
devolve their affairs. Since its establishment, significant administrative functions 
became devolved to local authorities by the decisions of committee (Kim 2002, 1).
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Fiscal Arrangements
In 1999, Kim government raised the rate of Local Share Tax from 13.275 percent of 
internal taxes to 15 percent in order to fund local finance and reduce the fiscal gap 
between SNGs. Although such measure was a breakthrough in local finance in that the 
rate, 13.275 had kept unchanged nearly for twenty years since 1983 (Geum 2009, 15).
Kim government, however, did not any measures to reform local tax system 
fundamentally (Na 2004, 62-3). Such relatively passive approach of Kim government in 
local finance can be explained by the fact that the fiscal constraints which were caused 
by the financial crisis in 1997 overwhelmed the demands of expanding local finance
(Geum 2009, 15).
5.5. From 2003 to 2007 (Roh Mu-haeon government) 
Contextual factors
The presidential election of 2002 observed quite interesting confrontation of major 
candidates: Lee Hoi-chang, the candidate of the main opposition party, the Grand 
National Party and Roh Moo-hyun, the candidate of the ruling party, the Millennium 
Democratic Party. Lee was supported mainly by conservative old generation meanwhile 
Roh was supported by progressive young generation. Most people did not expect Roh’s 
victory because he was a high school graduate without a college education, becoming a 
human rights lawyer by passing a difficult bar exam. He was the epitome of the self-
made man and a champion of the weak and the poor, an image that appealed to the 
young generation (Kim 2009, 9). 
Therefore, his inauguration as the 16th president foreshowed the fundamental and 
unprecedented reforms thorough almost all sectors of Korean society including 
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decentralization policy. In addition, before being the President, in 1993, Roh established 
‘the Institute of Practical Research for Local democracy’ where he studied local 
democracy and devised the policy orientation for decentralization and balanced regional 
development. Such career partly contributed to forming the policy agenda of his 
government.11
After the inauguration of presidency, the fraction of the MDP which followed Roh set 
up the new Uri (‘ours’) Party after failure of reform in MDP. Uri won a narrow overall 
majority in the National Assembly in 2004. However, Uri lost its majority as a few 
deputies defected to other parties. And as the Presidential term of Roh was drawing to 
an end (2007), Uri was beset by intense factional disputes as rivals looked beyond 2007
(Burnell and Randall 2005, 505).
The characteristics of policy process
During the 16th presidential election, civil groups in Korea concentrated on 
campaigns to recommend progressive decentralization policies to the candidates. In 
November 2002, just one month before the new Presidential election, civil movement
organizations established ‘the National Civic movement for Local democracy and 
Balanced regional development (NCLB)’ and campaigned for adopting decentralization
as a national agenda during the Presidential election. After Roh who proposed radical 
decentralization as one of major catchphrases won the election, he pronounced 
‘Decentralization and Balanced Regional Development’ as one of national agenda and 
promised to implement assertively. When the reform bills such as ‘the Special Act of 
decentralization was debated in the National Assembly in late 2003, the NCLB also
persuaded the related parliament men to enforce them to agree to the bills together with 
                                           
11 The official website of Roh Mu-haeon. http://www.knowhow.or.kr
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four associations of SNGs. Such civil groups’ activities for decentralization are
significant in policy process in that they function as pushing a policy agenda based on 
‘bottom-up’ demands. However, their institution-oriented approach had some limitation 
in that expansion of social capital and citizen’s participation are relatively neglected
(Jang 2003, 5).
As discussed above, Bahl and Jorge (2006)’s ‘six steps’ of implementing fiscal 
decentralization has theoretical relevance for explaining the decentralization policy of 
Roh government as follows:
 Step 1: A national debate involving the key stakeholders. During the Presidential
election, decentralization was one of the most issues among the candidates as 
well as civil society and academia. Until ‘the Special Act on Decentralization’
being enforced, the necessity and ways of decentralization was continuously
discussed and it was mainly led by ‘the Presidential Committee on Government 
Innovation & Decentralization (PCGID)’, reaching the consensus to the 
decentralization policy.
 Step 2: The design of the decentralization program. Soon after the inauguration, 
Roh government pronounced ‘the roadmap for decentralization (Box 1), which 
was a framework and timetable of decentralization policy.
Box 1 The Roadmap for Decentralization in Korea
1. Reallocate authority between national and local governments
 Overhaul laws concerning decentralization to establish clear criteria for allocating responsibilities 
between  national and local governments.
 Implement an extensive transfer of national government authority to local levels.
 Enhance local autonomy in education through increased linkages between local general government 
and educational authorities and participation by residents.
 Introduce a local police force system.
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 Consolidate the special local administrative offices, which hamper local government autonomy.
2. Implement sweeping fiscal decentralization
 Expand local financing capacity, in part by transferring national taxes to the local level, and correct 
interregional imbalances.
 Overhaul local tax administration and promote more active use of the scope for tax-rate flexibility.
 Strengthen autonomy in local public finances by reforming the grant system and eliminating the 
requirement for case-by-case approval of local bond issues.
 Ensure the transparency and soundness of local fiscal management.
3. Enhance local government’s capacity for autonomy
 Strengthen the legal framework for local government autonomy, including urban planning.
 Increase the quality of the local civil service through education, training and personnel exchanges.
4. Revitalise local legislatures and overhaul the local election process to reverse declining turnout
5. Strengthen accountability in local governments
 Balance increased autonomy with greater accountability through democratic oversight and an 
improved evaluation system.
6. Revitalise civic society and expand their participation in local civic affairs
7. Secure co-operative intergovernmental relations
 Strengthen collaboration between national and local governments and between local governments 
and improve mediation to resolve intergovernmental conflicts.
Source: Presidential Committee for Government Innovation and Decentralization (2003).
 Step 3: The decentralization law. ‘The Special Act on Decentralization’ was 
enforced in 2004.
 Step 4: Adopting a set of implementing regulations. The PCGID set up the Five-
year Decentralization Plan on the basis of ‘the Special Act on Decentralization.’
 Step 5: Implementation and Step 6: Monitoring. Related ministries implemented 
decentralization by enforcing and amending norms. The committee monitored their 
tasks regularly and reported the result to the President.
Although such exemplary decentralization implementation yielded significant outputs, 
it could not overcome some constraints. First, the powerful presidential committee
distorted the formal policy process and raised bureaucratic resistance. The PCGID was 
established under the President like the impartial organizations of former governments. 
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However, the committee had a significant number of experts and executive staffs who 
came from related ministries and research institutions unlike those of former 
governments. Furthermore, the system of direct reports to the President carcassed the 
State Council, the highest policy decision making organization. Moreover, the PCGID
often conflicted with ministries in the stage of implementing because the roadmap for 
decentralization was made without sufficient discussion with related ministries.
Secondly, on the basis of the roadmap for decentralization, Roh government planed to 
enforce ‘the Omnibus Governing Authority Transfer Act’ in order to transfer national
government’s affairs without amending each related acts in various standing committees 
of the National Assembly. It was, however, frustrated by the National Assembly which 
rejected it on grounds that the exclusive deliberation of affairs in just one standing 
committee could violate the deliberation right of each related standing committee. 
Policy Outputs
Institutional Arrangements
On the base of the roadmap for decentralization, numerous institutions had been 
enacted. First, to realign authority between the national government and SNGs, ‘the 
Special Decentralization Act’ was enacted in January 2004. It contained the basic 
principles, priorities, and establishment of promotion organization and procedures as an 
important legal guideline for legislative or administrative matters (PCGID 2007, 124).
Jeju Island had needed more autonomous system than other regions to match its 
distinctive geographical character. To accomplish this, a special law on the 
establishment of the Act on Jeju Special Self-Governing Province and International Free 
City was passed in the National Assembly in February 2006 (PCGID 2007, 126-7). To 
promote administrative independence of SNGs, ‘the Total Labor Cost System’ was
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introduced in 2007 with the substantial abolition of the national government’s authority
to approve of SNG’s organizations and quorums. It allowed SNGs to freely mange 
administrative bodies and quorums based on related labor costs and expenditures of 
each SNG (PCGID 2007, 126-7). ‘The Citizen Suit System’ and ‘the Citizen Recall 
System’ was also introduced in 2005 and 2006 respectively in order to strengthen the 
accountability of SNGs.
Despite such outstanding accomplishments compared with former governments, there 
were some limitations. First, the scope of roadmap for decentralization is too broad to 
implement and control (Park 2006, 211). Restructuring of local special administrative 
organizations of national miseries was frustrated mainly due to the resistance of 
bureaucrats and related interest groups. Secondly, in order to establish cooperative 
intergovernmental relationship, Roh government planed to hold regular meetings 
between the president and representatives of the heads of SNGs and the Associations of 
SNGs. Although it allow SNGs to participate in the policy process of the national
government and to strengthen the role and functions of the four Associations of SNGs, it 
was not institutionalized by any formal institutions.
Fiscal Arrangements
In order to enhance fiscal autonomy, the transfer of financial resources from the 
national government to SNGs with functional adjustments, the abolition of Local 
transfer fund, establishment of Balanced National Development Special Account, and 
improvements in the Local shared tax were institutionalized (PCGID 2007, 157-165). 
From mid-2003 to February 2004, the PCGID categorized the national subsidies into 
three types. The first type is the national subsidy project where local transfers are 
desirable. The second is the project which is desirable to be adopted into the Balance 
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National Development Special Account (BNDSA). The last is the project which is 
desirable to be maintained based on subsidies. As a result, 163 projects (worth 1.1 
trillion won) have been transferred to SNGs (PCGID 2007, 157-165). By the 
amendment of the Local shared tax Act in January 2004, the local shared tax rate was 
increased from 15% (8.4 trillion won) in 2000 to 19.13 % in 2005 and went up to 
19.24% in 2006 (PCGID 2007, 157-165). The structure of Local shared tax was also 
changed being categorized into three groups: the general shared tax, the special shared 
tax, and the shared tax for decentralization. The Local Transfer Fund, a block grant fund 
introduced in 1991 to promote balanced regional development was abolished and its 
main revenues were merged to the BNDSA.
5.6. From 2008 up to now (Lee Myung-bak government)
Contextual factors and Ideological orientation of governments
Lee Myung-bak, the candidate of the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) 
during Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Mu-haeon governments, won the 17th Presidential 
Election with 48.7% turnout in late 2007.12 The re-seizure of the Presidency of more 
conservative party foretold the significant changes such as privatization and 
marketization of public services in all most sectors (Yang 2008). 
Meanwhile, the decentralization policy orientation of Lee Myung-bak’s government 
was much similar to Roh Mu-haeon’s government. Rather, it was more fundamental in 
that it included structural reform agenda such as reorganizing current two tier structure 
of SNGs. Among ‘the 100 policy tasks’ of Lee Myung-bak’s government, 
decentralization related tasks are: 
                                           
12 National Election Commission. http://www.nec.go.kr
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1. Reorganizing local administrative system
2. Transferring Government power to local governments 
3. Expanding the financial resources of local governments
4. Introducing municipal police13
The political environment of Lee government was also more favorable for 
decentralization than previous governments. First, the President himself is the former 
mayor of Seoul Metropolitan city (from 2002.7 to 2006.6) as well as the second 
chairman of Governors Association of Korea (GAOK) during Mayor’s tenure. 14 15
Such career distinguished himself from previous Presidents who were commonly pure 
politicians and had no experience in SNGs. Secondly; the GNP won the 18th National 
Assembly Election in April 2008 with seizure of 169 seats out of a total 299 seats (57%). 
Holding majority meant that it became possible to process most bills without any 
comprise with opposition parties. Unlike the previous governments which had 
confronted a strong opposition in National Assembly, the current government has much 
more possibilities to pass important reform bills including decentralization. 
The characteristics of policy process
The process of decentralization in Lee government is still continuing. Therefore, the 
overall assessment might be not appropriate until the end of Lee government. In this 
part, nevertheless, it is assessed on the base of current outputs. 
Among decentralization tasks of Lee government, some tasks such as transferring 
government power to SNGs and expanding the financial resources of SNGs had already
been implemented during previous governments although most SNGs are still 
                                           
13 The Office of the President. http://www.president.go.kr/kr/index.php
14 Seoul Metropolitan Citygovernment. http://www.gaok.or.kr
15 Governors Association of Korea. http://www.gaok.or.kr
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discontent with the extent. Introducing municipal police was also tried to introduce
during Roh government but failed. However, reorganizing local administrative system
is a fundamentally challenging task in that former governments tried to implement it but 
failed due to the extreme interest conflicts between SNGs, disagreement of achedemia, 
or political disagreement of opposition parties.
In spite of re-organization of national government in February 2008, the old actors of 
previous governments survived transforming their shape. The previous MOGAHA 
which was responsible for local finance was integrated to the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security (MOPAS) with the Civil Service Commission, the National 
Emergency Planning Commission and national informatization strategy functions of the 
Ministry of Information and Communication.16 The previous the MPB which was 
responsible for national budget was merged to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
(MOSF) with the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE).17 Meanwhile, the re-
organization of previous presidential commissions was delayed due to the 
administrative arrangements. Even under the new Commission, the resistance of 
ministries and stake-holders has still existed protesting the relevance of Commission’s 
decision of devolving some affairs of Ministries. For example, the deliberation of 
devolution of some fire fighting affairs which are the authority of the National 
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and provinces to basic level SNGs 
confronted severe protests of NEMA and provinces. The NEMA and provinces have not 
announced disagreement officially. But individual servants appealed the media that 
basic level SNGs had not sufficient capacity to execute fire fighting affairs and the 
budget necessary for devolution would cost more than 1.5 trillion won (Lim 2010).
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17 MOSF. www. Mosf.go.kr
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Policy Outputs
Institutional Arrangements
‘The special Act on Decentralization’ was amended as ‘the special Act on Promoting 
Decentralization’ in February, 2008. A new commission based on the amended Act was 
established in December, 2008. The new ‘Presidential Commission for Decentralization
(PCD)’ merged the previous PCGID and ‘the Presidential Committee on Promoting 
Devolution’ which were established which was established during Roh and Kim 
government respectively.18
Since the establishment, the decentralization policy has been led by the PCD. But the 
PCD was organized almost one year after Lee government inaugurated. With such a 
reason, main decentralization policies were devised and discussed in related ministries. 
The MOPAS, as the leading minster for SNGs, initiated all most of decentralization
policies. However, as for Reorganizing local administrative system, the National 
Assembly has also involved in it by establishing ‘the special committee for reorganizing 
local administration.’ in September 2009.19 While various opinions being suggested, in 
April 2010, the special committee passed ‘the Special Act for reorganizing local 
administration’ which prescribed some principles of reorganization which includes the 
abolishment of Metropolitan City Councils.20
Fiscal Arrangements
In September 2009, Lee government decided to introduce ‘the Local Consumption 
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20 The National Assembly. www.assembly.go.kr
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Tax’ (LCT) and ‘the Local Income Tax (LIT)’ in order to enhance SNG’s tax autonomy. 
The LCT will be established by the converting 5% of Income tax, one of national taxes. 
Meanwhile, the LIT would be created by the change of the current Income Levy 
Inhabitant Tax, one of local taxes. While the policy process of new local taxes, the 
MOPAS confronted with the MOSF which hesitated to agree to the introduction of new 
local Taxes, insisting the possibility that only ‘rich’ SNGs may benefit from it. When 
the president recalled the situation, he commented that ‘it was a determination for 
enhancing the competiveness of SNG’ (Lee 2009).
5.7. Interim Conclusion
There are similarities in the institutionalizations of decentralization policy through 
the governments despite of different ideological orientations (Table 4). All most 
governments established an organization for decentralization. Particularly since Kim 
dae-jung government, its role has become much important by being established under 
the President. Whenever new government was inaugurated, new institutions were 
established, although there are no significant differences between them. This could be 
explained by that new government wants to differentiate it from the previous 
governments. Meanwhile, recurrent institutionalization retarded the overall reform 
schedule due to time-consuming for legal and administrative arrangements. 
Table 4 The change of decentralization policy
Period 
(President)
Contextual factors & 
Ideological orientation Reform Agenda
Institutions, 
Main actors & Reforms
Before 1987
- The priority of
economic development 
- Right
- decentralization is 
claimed intermittently 
but merely rhetoric
- Constitution had suspended
local autonomy
- governor, mayors appointed 
by national government
1988 to 1992
(Roh Tae-wo)
-Rapid Democratization
- Right
- Polictical 
decentalization
- 1988 new constitution
gurantee local autonomy
- Opposition party struggled
for full local autonomy 
(including chiefs elections)
６６
1993 to 1997
(Kim young-sam)
-Rapid Democratization
- Right
- Political 
decentrlaization
- 1995 governors and mayors 
election 
 President, Opposition party
1998 to 2002
(Kim Dae-Jung)
- Hormanization of 
democracy and market 
economy
- Left
- Adminstrative
decentralization
- 1998, devolution law
- President
- Independent commission
2003 to 2007
(Roh Mu-haeon)
- Focusing on welfare
- Left
- Comprehensive
decentralization
including fiscal 
decentralization
-.2003 decentralization
- President
- Civil movement organization
- Independent commission
2008 to now
Lee Myung-bak’s 
government)
- Focusing on economy
- Right 
- Fundermental reforms
(Restructuring)
-President
-Related Ministries
- Independent commission
Source: Author
After democratization, the distribution of general government expenditure (including 
SNGs) shows also similar patterns through successive governments despite of different 
policy orientation, particularly from 1998 to 2007 when more progressive Kim Dae-
Jung and Roh Mu-haeon seized presidential power (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Selected Outlays of General Government by Function (at Current Prices, Annual)
Source: The Bank of Korea
Economic priority had continued followed by education, general public service, 
health and social protection in sequence. Meanwhile, the average change of expenditure 
during each government implicates the policy orientation of each government (Figure 6). 
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Overall the average growth of expenditure during Roh Tae-wo government (1988-1992) 
is higher than any following government. This may be attributed to the economic 
affluence and less fiscal constraint than other governments. The expenditures of general 
public service, public order & safety, environment protection, recreation, culture & 
religion, health, and education have fallen through successive governments with the 
exception of health increase during Kim Dae-Jung government.
Figure 6 the average change of expenditure during each government                (Unit: %)
Source: The Bank of Korea
Meanwhile, the expenditure of defense, economic affairs, housing community & 
amenities, and social protection increased during Roh Mu-haeon government. Despite 
of Kim Dae-Jung government’s progressive orientation, there is hardly any difference to 
previous conservative government. This may be mainly attributed to the fiscal 
constraints which were caused by financial crisis in late 1997. Meanwhile, Roh Mu-
haeon government increased the expenditure of social protection although it is less than 
during Roh Tae-wo government. This may be interpreted that Roh Mu-haeon 
government endeavored to balance the economic growth and social protection.
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Through the governments, the relationship between national government and SNGs 
was gradually moving from unilateral relationship to cooperative one. However, the 
extent of formal institutionalization was significantly low mainly due to the national 
government’s preference to administrative arrangement such as informal and irregular 
meetings. 
In fiscal aspect, the funding of local finance of each government was mainly based on 
intergovernmental transfer rather than local taxes, and ad hoc rather than systemic with 
few exceptions. After democratization, only one national tax, Tobacco Sales Tax, was 
transferred to basic level SNGs in 1988.
Although Horse-race Tax in 1988, a Fire-fighting Facilities Tax in 1991, and a 
Regional Development Tax in 1991 became part of the province tax base, this was just 
rearrangement which was transferred from county/city tax to province tax. National
government raised Local share tax or introduced a new type block grant, Local transfer 
fund. The main reason which national government prefers intergovernmental transfer
funding is that it is concerned with the unequal distribution of tax bases between SNGs. 
Moreover, while devolving national affairs, there were not sufficient fiscal arrangements, 
which was problematic in that it violated one of fiscal federalization’s principles that 
revenue should follow expenditure. In fact, it is quite difficult to calculate exact amount 
of budget which is necessary for devolving a national affair. Moreover, ‘revenue reform 
is a more manageable issue, and more likely to yield visible, short-term results’ (Bahl 
1999, 7)
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6. THE OUTCOMES OF FISCAL DENATIONALIZAITON IN KOREA
As a complex multilevel phenomenon, encompassing a number of political, fiscal and 
administrative dimensions, decentralization also is difficult to measure (Saltman, 
Bankauskaite, and Vrangbaek 2007, 15). With such consideration, in this chapter, the 
outcomes of decentralization are assessed as Figure 7.
Figure 7 Framework of Assessment of Decentralization Outcome 
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT
(Deregulation, Devolution)
DIRECT
OUTCOME
DECENTRALIZATION
POLICY
FISCLA ARRANGEMENT
(Revenue, Expenditure)
INDIRECT
OUTCOME
Regional Civic Society
ECONOMICAL
DEVELOPMENT
(GRDP, etc)
SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT
(Health Status, etc)
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
•The Extent of Change
•The Enhance of Regional equality
ASSESSMENT METHOD
•Time series Analysis
•Cross country Analysis
•Indicator Analysis
Source: Author
As a policy, decentralization is implemented through SNG. Decentralization policies 
could impact SNGs directly through the change of their current revenue and expenditure. 
Spontaneously, decentralization polices impact regional society through the change of 
public provisions. Fiscal decentralization is one of policy tools for accomplishing socio-
economical development. In this study, ‘sustainable development model’ is referred as 
the main criteria of socio-economical development. Sustainable development can be 
defined as “as a process of managing a portfolio of assets to preserve and enhance the 
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opportunities people face” (Soubbotina 2004, 114). Sustainable development includes
not only economical aspects such as GDP per capita but also social aspects such as 
social aspects such as health status. Based on such consideration, the indicators are like 
Table 5.
Table 5 Measurement of Outcomes of Fiscal Decentralization
Target Aspects Sub-aspect Indicators (example)
Institutional Aspect Restructuring 
intergovernmental
relations
 Redistribution of Affairs
 The change of national
government’s monitoring approach
to SNGs (Deregulation)
Revenue  The Change of Revenue scale 
 The Composition of Revenue
SNGs
Fiscal aspect
Expenditure  The Change of Expenditure scale
 The Composition of expenditure
 GDP per capita
 GRDP (Growth Regional Domestic)
 Distribution of income tax base
Economic Aspect Income 
 Unemployment
Health Status  Life expectancy 
 Infant mortality rate
Social welfare  Public Social Expenditure
Education &
Information
 public spending on education
 Enrollment rates
 Digital Opportunity Index
Regional
Society
Social Aspects
Quality of Life  Life satisfaction
Source: Author
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6.1. The Outcomes of Fiscal Decentralization in SNGs
Fiscal decentralization impacts on various aspects of national and SNG relationship
(Kim 1997, 153). Among them, in this study, two dimensions are focused. First, 
institutional dimension includes redistribution of affairs and types of national control. 
Second, fiscal dimension is concerned with the scale and compositions of revenue and 
expenditure in SNG. The assess methods are based on the time-series analysis and 
comparison of other OECD countries. 
6.1.1. Institutional Dimension
Redistribution of National and Autonomous Affairs by Devolution
Since the Constitution guaranteed local autonomy in 1987, various institutional 
measures have been devised. In terms of institutions, the main achievements are 
devolution of national government’s affairs and the change of approach of national
government’s monitor on SNGs. 
The scope of functions which SNGs must have depends on the context of each 
country such as historical, political and socio-economic environment (Kim 1997, 157). 
The outcome of redistribution policy in Korea, however, is not substantial compared 
with the increasing role of SNGs. Unlike most OECD countries, critical local services 
are not included in the functional inventory of Korean SNGs. Particularly, the basic
level SNG doesn't have any right and responsibility for education, crime control, fire 
prevention and traffic regulation which are essential for managing its region. The 
devolution of national government’s affairs has been led by the Presidential Committee 
of Promoting Devolution (PCPD) since 1998. Despite of its endeavor, the rate of 
national affairs and autonomous affairs is 73:15 in 2002 compared with 75:13 in 1994. 
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This means that national government has still substantial affairs compared to SNG. Out
of total 41,603 units of administrative affairs, the PCPD devolved or redistributed only
one percentage (1481 units) of them (Table 6).
Moreover, even the resolutions of devolution have not been implemented effectively
because of the hesitancy and resistance of national ministries the delay of legal 
arrangement in the National Assembly. In order to deal with the problem of delayed 
implementation by some national ministries, Roh Mu-haeon government submitted a 
special law that deals with the already resolved functions en bloc but failed due to the 
hesitance of the National Assembly.
Table 6 Devolution decision and Implementation                               Unit: number
Total 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Resolution* 1,481 185 176 251 478 53 203 80 55
Implementation** 1,189 2 92 146 164 204 436 43 102
Note: Decision* indicates the number of final devolution decision by the Committee
     Implementation** indicated the number of institutional arrangement after devolution decision
Source: the Presidential Commission for Decentralization
Roh Mu-haeon government tried to implement more fundamental redistribution policy 
such as restructuring of local special administrative organizations of national miseries or 
introducing municipal police but frustrated by the severe protests of stake holders.
Changing of National government’s control approach
Although the basic intergovernmental relation has not changed significantly due to 
the maintenance of the Constitution and related Acts, the approach to regulating or 
monitoring of SNG by national government has changed significantly. As the ministry 
which is responsible for policy making, implementing and monitoring of local finance, 
the Ministry of Public Affairs and Security (MOPAS) has changed its approach to SNGs. 
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In fact, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the predecessor of MOPAS had been 
notorious among SNGs and opposition political parties for its unilateral and oppressive 
control of SNGs and regional society during authoritarian regime. That is why Kim dae-
Jung argued its abolishment during the Presidential campaign. The MHA regulated 
organizational or fiscal operations of SNGs on ex ante and case-by-case base. 
Democratization and its consolidation, however, changed its regulation approach as 
ex-post and objective one. For example, it transformed the regulation of local borrowing 
from approval system on a case-by-case basis to objective debt limit system under Roh 
Mu-haeon government. Now SNGs can issue local bonds under each limit which is set 
by objective criteria. 
6.1.2. Financial Dimension
The Change of Scale of Budget
As seen in Figure 8, overall trend shows that the rate of SNG’ budget as percentage to 
GDP become larger than national government’s budget. Such trend also tells that SNG 
will have much important role in national economy in long term. 
Figure 8 the Change of National and Sub-national government’s budget as percentage to GDP             (Unit: %)
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
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Revenue Aspect
Growing dependency on national government 
Overall, the rate of local (self) revenue (as sum of local tax and non-local tax) kept 
steadily by 1997 but since 1998 it decreased except 2003 and 2004 (Figure 10). 
Meanwhile, the trend of Local (intergovernmental) transfer (Local Share Tax, Local 
Transfer Fund, and National Treasury Subsidies) shows opposite trend to that of local 
revenue. Such phenomenon can be observed not only in Korea but also other OECD 
countries, which is somewhat paradoxical in that ‘more decentralization coincides with
more dependency on national government resources’ (Blöchliger 2006, 6). Such fact 
also reflects that the decentralization policy of Korean government, particularly since 
2003 has been based on approach to guaranteeing stable revenue flow rather increasing
SNGs’ fiscal discretion by increasing tax autonomy (Bahl 1999, 18-20).
Figure 9 the change of revenue of sub-national government as percentage to total revenue       (Unit: %)
Source: Ministry Of Public Administration and Security
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Meanwhile, local tax is weak compared to national tax (Figure 10). The rate of national 
and local tax has kept approximately as 80:20 although there are increases
intertemporally.
Figure 10 the Composition of National and Local Tax                             (Unit: %)
Source: Ministry Of Public Administration and Security
The comparison with other OECD countries shows that Korea has also relatively low 
local tax despite of its high expenditure (Figure 11). It is mainly due to substantial 
national government’s ‘delegated functions’ and its budgets (Jones and Yokoyama 2005, 
4). Therefore, it is more realistic approach to include the intergovernmental transfer 
when the exact situation of SNG’s fiscal capacity is measured in Korea.
Figure 11 Sub national government share in general government revenues and expenditure in 2003   (Unit: %)
Source: Jones, R. S. and T. Yokoyama (2005)
７６
The degree of revenue autonomy including non-local tax and non-earmarked grant
The degree of revenue capacity of SNG can be measure by ‘the degree of fiscal 
autonomy (Jaejung Jajudo)’. According to the MOPAS, it is devised to measure the 
total revenue which a SNG can manage under its discretion including non-earmarked 
grants from national government or regional government such as Metropolitan City 
Revenue Sharing or Province Revenue Sharing.21 Its formula is {[Self revenue (local 
tax + non-local tax revenue) + ‘Autonomous revenue’ (Local Share Tax+ Metropolitan 
City Revenue Sharing+ Province Revenue Sharing)]/ total revenue} x 100. The degree 
of fiscal autonomy in 2007 increased averagely compared with 2001. The fiscal 
disparities between SNGs (indicated by coefficient variable) decreased overall.
Table 7 the degree of fiscal autonomy               (Unit: %, value)
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
Expenditure Aspect
High expenditure compared with Other OECD countries
The expenditure composition rate of national government and SNG is approximately 
60:40 although there are up and downs intertemporally (Figure 12). 
                                           
21 Local finance information system (http://lofin.mopas.go.kr/)
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Figure 12 the expenditure composition rate of national and sub-national government    (Unit: %)
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
Such high expenditure with low local tax revenue distinguishes Korea from other
OECD countries (Jones and Yokoyama 2005, 4).
Social development’s share has expended
Korean local public expenditures consist of five categories according to the use of 
funds, and they are (i) general administration, (ii) social development, (iii) economic 
development, (iv) civil defense, and (v) support and other expenditure.22 The sub-
categories of each categoires are like Table 8
Table 8 The categories of local public expenditure
Category Sub-categories
General administration Legislation & Election, General Administration
Social development Education & Culture, Health & Amenities, Social Security, Housing & Development of Local Community
Economic development Agriculture & Fishery, Regional Economy Development, Preservation Development of Resources, Transpor
Civil defense Civil Defence, Fire Service
Support and other expenditure Local Debt Repayment, All Other Expenditures
Source: Ministry Of Public Administration and Security
Among such five categories, the portion of general administration, social development, 
and economic development is larger than others. Figure 15 shows the change of main 
                                           
22 Local Finance Information System. http://lofin.mopas.go.kr/
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three expenditures (general administration, social development, and economic 
development) as percentage of SNGs’ total expenditure 1996 to 2007. Since 1998, the 
social development increased than other expenditures and the gap became much larger.
This is mainly due to the political consideration to focus on social development.
Figure 13 the selected expenditures of SNG as percentage of total budget (Unit: %)
Source: Ministry Of Public Administration and Security
Figure 13 shows a closer look of sub-categories of social development (lines) and 
economic development (bars) as each percentage of total expenditure 2002 to 2007. 
Among sub-categories of social development expenditure, the rate of social security is 
9% in 2002 but rose up to 15% in 2007. Meanwhile all sub-categories of economic 
development expenditure kept steadily or decreased. 
Figure 14 Social Development and Economic Development Expenditure    (Unit: %)
Source: Ministry Of Public Administration and Security
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Such result demand a closer look on social security expenditure. It could be desirable to 
increase the budget of social welfare in that it is still lower than that of other OECD 
countries. However, the side effect is that social welfare budgets increased without 
consideration of funding arrangement between governments. 
After democratization in 1987, institutionalization for social development and its 
expenditure increased rapidly. Most public services of social welfare in Korea are 
implemented under control of national governments. Moreover, as new social welfare 
programs such as ‘the Long-term Care Security for the Elderly’ and ‘the Basic Old-age 
Pension’ were introduced in 2008, the burden of SNGs will be much higher than before. 
The funding is mainly matched by sharing of national government and SNGs. The 
matching rate is about 70:30 between national government and SNGs (Table 9). Such 
finance structure could cause serious budget deficits in SNGs which do not have 
sufficient funding for matching fund (Lee 2007, 108).
Figure 15 Earmarked Grants and matching funds of Social welfare budget                     (Unit: %)
Source: Ministry Of Public Administration and Security
Figure 15 shows social security expenditure of basic level SNGs as percentage of 
each total budget from 2002 to 2007. Among basic level SNGs, the budget of 
Metropolitan city Wards has increased much more than other governments. It increased 
８０
over 40% in 2007. This is mainly attributed to the characteristic of population 
distribution of Metropolitan city Wards where the beneficiaries of social policies such as 
elder people concentrated much more than in other governments (Lee 2007, 108).
Figure 16 Social Security Expenditure of basic level SNGs as percentage of each total budget (Unit: %)
Source: Ministry Of Public Administration and Security
Budget which SNGs can spend at their own discretion was unstable
‘Self-financed business budget’ can be defined as business budget excluding 
earmarked granted business budget.23 The concept is used to measure the amount of 
budget which SNGs can spend at its own discretion. It increased until 2005 but began to 
decrease steeply since 2006 (Table 10). This is attributed mostly to the change of 
national government's policy orientation which decided to concentrate on social 
expenditure since 2004 and subsequent expenditure increase of SNGs (Lee 2007, 108).
Figure 17 Composition of Business budget of SNG as percentage of total budget (Unit: %)
Source: Ministry Of Public Administration and Security
                                           
23 Local Finance Information System. http://lofin.mopas.go.kr/
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The problem is more serious in basic level SNGs. Since 2006, in all basic level SNGs,
the self-financed business budget decreased (Figure 18). Particularly, Metropolitan City 
Wards had already decreased since 2004 and more steeply decreased than others. In 
2007, the average rate of self-financed business budget of Metropolitan City Wards is 
just 14.8%. This means that such governments have hardly any budget for their own 
business after spending budget on uncontrollable expenses such as wages or matching 
fund of earmarked grants. Moreover, cities (Si) and counties (Gun) whose functions are 
much more than those of wards (Gu) also confront with decreasing self-financed
business budgets. This means that the capacity of SNG for regional development is 
reducing. Most of all, self-determination, the essence of local democracy, might be 
impotent if such trend continues (Lee 2007, 110).
Figure 18 Self-Financed Business budget as percentage to total budet                     (Unit: %)
Source: Ministry Of Public Administration and Security
The discrepancy between the spending responsibilities and funding capacity in 
education
Unlike most other OECD countries, in Korea, general SNG and educational SNG are 
separated in terms of institution arrangement. Education Boards and Offices of 
Education, located at the provincial and metropolitan city level have responsibility for 
８２
primary and secondary education.24 Although the head of each Office is elected directly 
by residents since 2007, the dual representative system of general and education SNG
still has a fiscal problem. Despite of separated responsibility, SNG has to provide 19% 
of total budget of educational entities by related laws thorough the Local Education Tax 
and a fixed share of local tax revenue. Such discrepancy between the spending 
responsibilities and funding capacity has limited the development of autonomy in 
education and discouraged financing efforts by SNGs (OECD 2005, 75).
6.2. The Outcomes of Decentralization in Regional Societies
The outcomes of decentralization in regional societies has significant implications in 
that it can be one of the most important criteria of whose argument are more relevance
about whether decentralization has a positive outcomes on socio-economical 
development of regional societies. However, it should be noted that it is not simple 
work to evaluate the pure effects of decentralization on regional societies. The main 
reason is that the outcomes of decentralization can be intervened by some factors such 
as income and other national or SNG’s policies. Therefore, the outcomes should be 
taken as the proxy to measure the effect of decentralization. 
In this study, the change of objective indicators such as GRDP (Gross Regional 
Domestic Products) and the subjective effects such as Social Survey of Koran Statistics 
Office are evaluated. The basic unit of analysis is the province: 9 provinces and 7 major 
cities (Seoul and the mega cities), making 16 units. The 16 basic units of provinces and 
cities are classified into 2 regions: Capital Region which consists of Seoul, Incheon, and 
Kyonggi and Non-Captial region which consist of other provinces and major cities in 
                                           
24 Ministry Of Education, Science and Technology. http://www.mest.go.kr
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order to assess whether or not the regional disparity decrease. As already discussed, the 
inequality between regions is one of the main issues in Korea, it is meaningful to assess 
whether or not regional disparity enhance. 
The main methods how to measure the change in regional societies are two. The first 
one is whether the average level is higher by arithmetic mean average. The second one 
is whether spatial disparity is smaller by measuring a coefficient of variation which is 
the value of standard deviation divided by the average. 
6.2.1. Economic Aspect
Cross-country Comparison by GDP per caita
The GDP per capita of Korea is lower than that of OECD average through the time 
(Figure 19). It rapidly increased narrowing the gap of OECD averge rate until 2000. But 
since 2000, it kept steadily not narrowing the gap.
Figure 19 GDP per capita                                          (Unit: US dollar, PPP)
Source: National Accounts of OECD Countries, OECD (2008).
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Cross-regional Comparison by Growth of Regional Domestic Product (GRDP)
From 2001 through 2007, the GRDP of Capital Region was higher than that of Non-
Capital Region except 2003 (Figure 20). However, the spatial disparity (standard 
deviation) decreased due to the increase of growth in Non-Capital Region and decrease 
of growth of Capital Region. The result was partly attributed to government’s spatial 
policy. Beginning in 2002, Roh Mu-haeon government offered diverse incentives for 
industries to locate in provinces other than the capital region, on the one hand, and 
imposed strong restrictions on the expansion of economic activities in the capital region, 
on the other (Huang and Bocchi 2009, 329).
Figure 20 GRDP of Capital Region and Non-capital Region as Rate of Change of GRDP compared 
to year 2005      (Unit: %, value)
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
Unemployment
The unemployment rate of Capital Region and Non-capital Region has decreased 
through 2000s and the gap became narrower. The average of total region is lower than 
that of OECD countries. (Figure 21)
Figure 21 Unemployment Rate                              (Unit: %, value)
８５
Note : Unemployment rate is the ratio of number of persons unemployed and the number of persons in the 
labour force which is the sum of the numbers of persons employed and unemployed.
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr), OECD (2008), OECD Main Economic Indicators
6.2.2. Social Aspect
Income distribution
Cross-national Comparison by Gini Coefficient
Despite of economic growth, the income distribution as shown by Gini Coefficient 
exacerbated in Korea compared to other OECD countries (Table 9).
Table 9 Gini Coefficient                                            (Unit: Value)
Mid1990s Early 2000s Mid 2000
Korea 0.264 0.272 0.312 
OECD Average 0.309 0.306 0.311 
Source: KOSIS, OECD (2008), OECD Main Economic Indicators
Cross-regional Comparison by income tax collection
The income disparity between regions which is measured by the collection of general 
income tax is growing in Korea (Figure 22).25
Figure 22 Amount of General Income tax collection                     (Unit: million won)
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
                                           
25 The Gini Coefficient of each region is officially not announced in Korea. 
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Health Status
Cross-national Comparison by Infant mortality and Life expectancy
Within OECD area, Korea is one of the most countries whose infant mortality 
reduced since 1970. In 1970, the rate is 45 meanwhile it reduced as 5.3 in 2002 (Figure 
23).
Figure 23: Infant mortality (Deaths per 1 000 live births)
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In Korea, life expectancy at birth for women and men combined increased steadily 
and became higher than that of OECD average since 2006 (Figure 24).
Figure 24 Life expectancy at age 0                                           (Unit: age)
Source: OECD Health Data 2009, June 2009
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Cross-regional Comparison by infant mortality and Life expectancy
The infant mortality of Capital Region was higher than that of Non capital region 
from 1996 through 2006. However, the spatial disparity decreased and the overall level 
of 2000s enhanced much more than that of 1990s (Table 10).
Table 10 Infant mortality rate in Korea          (Unit: Per 1,000 live births)
1996 1999 2002 2006
Average 7.7 6.2 5.3 4.1
Standard Deviation 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7
Coefficient of 
Variable
0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16
Capital Region 7.1 5.1 4.9 4.0
Non-Capital Region 8.3 6.8 5.8 4.5
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, various years
The life expectancy at birth for women and men combined of Capital Region was 
higher than that of Non capital region in 2005 and 2008 (Table 11).
Table 11 The life expectancy at birth for women and men in Korea  (Unit: age)
2005 2008
Average 78.37 79.75
Capital Region 79.35 80.81
Non-Capital Region 78.15 79.50
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
Public Social Expenditure
Cross-national Comparison 
Although the public social expenditure increased in Korea since late 1990s, it is 
significantly lower than the average of OECD (Figure 25)
８８
Figure 25 The public social expenditure as percentage of GDP               (Unit: %)
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
Cross-regional Comparison by the expenditure of social protection
The social expenditure of SNG increased. However, the gap between Capital and 
Non-Capital region also increased (Table 12).
Table 12 The expenditure of social protection in sub-national government as percentage of total 
general budget                                                                (Unit: %)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Average 14.73 15.98 17.77 19.35 
Coefficient of Variable 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.27 
Capital Region 17.93 20.13 23.04 24.65 
Non-Capital Region 14.00 15.02 16.55 18.13 
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
Education and Information
Cross-national Comparison by Education Expenditure, School enrollment, Informatization
The overall rate of public expenditure is still lower than that of OECD. Meanwhile 
the private expenditure is much higher than that of OECD (Table 13).
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Table 13 Education Expenditure as percentage to GDP                             (Unit: %)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2006
OECD 
Average
Public expenditure 4.3 4.8 4.2 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.9
Private expenditure 2.8 3.4 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 `2.9 0.8
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance (2006)
The enrollment rate of population aged from 5 to 29 is higher than that of OECD 
average. Meanwhile, that of population aged from 3 to 4 and 4and over is lower than 
that of OECD average (Table 14).
Table 14 Enrollment rates, by age (2004)
40 and over 
as a 
percentage 
of the 
population 
aged
4 and under 
as a 
percentage 
of the 
population
aged 3-4
5-14 as a 
percentage 
of the 
population
aged 5-14
15-19 as a 
percentage 
of the 
population
aged 15-19
20-29 as a 
percentage 
of the 
population
aged 20-29
30-39 as a 
percentage 
of the 
population
aged 30-39
40 and over
OECD average 66.3   98.3   80.5   24.7   5.6   1.6   
Korea 20.3   93.5   85.2   27.4   1.9   0.4   
Note: Full-time and part-time students in public and private institutions
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance (2006)
The DOI is an index devised by International Telecommunication Union for 
measuring the Information Society. Korea is one of the leading countries in information 
technology, industry and utilization26 (Figure 26).
                                           
26 International Telecommunication Union http://www.itu.int
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Figure 26 the Digital Opportunity Index in 2006
Source: ITU (International Telecommunication Union)
Cross-regional Comparison by the number of university and Internet usage
The number of university or college in rate Capital Region was higher than that of 
Non-Capital Region (Table 15).
Table 15 the number of university or college                 (Unit: number)
2006 2007 2008
Average 22 21.8 21.5
CV 0.70 0.69 0.70 
Capital Region 41.0 40.0 40.0 
Non-Capital Region 17.6 17.5 17.2 
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
The internet usage rate in Capital Region was higher than that of Non capital region 
in 2005 and 2008 (Table 16). However, the spatial disparity decreased.
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Table 16 Internet usage rate (Percentage of internet user to all people)                (Unit: %)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Average 63.8 68.4 71.1 72.7 73.2
CV 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 
Capital Region 69.5 74.1 76.6 79.0 79.7 
Non-Capital Region 62.5 67.1 69.8 71.3 71.8 
Source: KOSIS (www.kosis.kr)
Subjective indicators
Cross-country Comparison
According to the World Values Survey, the level of Life satisfaction of Korean people 
is lower than that of OECD average (Table 17). 
Table 17 Life satisfaction (1999-2004)                                             (Unit: %)
Gender Age Level of education Level of income
M F <25
25-
50
51-
64
65+ Low Middle High Low Middle High
Korea 45.4 44.6 44.9 44.0 45.2 56.8 32.9 46.2 45.9 60.3 47.5 32.7
OECD Average 59.5 59.2 61.4 58.9 58.8 59.8 55.3 60.7 64.4 67.1 59.4 51.3
Source: OECD Society at a Glance 2006, The World Values Survey, wave 1999-2004
Cross-regional Comparison
In this study, Social Survey of Korean Statistics Office (SS) in 2007 is used as 
subjective indicators. SS has been carried out since 1997 updating survey methods and 
indicators. In 2007, three areas such as Welfare, Culture and recreation, Income and 
consumption are selected for the survey. The surprising result is that subjective quality 
of life in Capital Region is not as high as its objective superiorities (Table 18). 
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People in Non-capital region satisfied with the overall living condition including 
medical care service more than people in Capital Region. However, the level of 
economical satisfactions of people in Capital Region and Non-capital regions are similar. 
Moreover, those are lower than social satisfactions.
Table 18 Rate of satisfaction with living condition and income                        (Unit: %)
Changes in Living Conditions*
Overall
Living condition
Medical Care 
Service
Social Security 
System
Level of 
Satisfaction with 
Income**
Opinion on Income 
Distribution***
Capital 
Region
27.8 28.8 17.3 10.0 2.3
Non-Capital 
Region
29.4 35.4 21.8 10.3 2.3
Note: *The rate is the percentage of people who answered as “get better (much, a little)”
** The rate the percentage of people who answered as “get better (very, moderately)”
*** The rate the percentage of people who answered as “equal (very, moderately)”
Source: Social Survey of Korean Statistics Office (2007)
As for welfare services which should be needed to expand, people in Capital Region 
and Non-capital regions responded the priorities commonly; the aged care service,  
supporting service for children in dual income family and single parent family, self-
reliance supporting service for children in low income family, the disabled care service 
Mother-infant care service (Table 19).
Table 19 Welfare Services Needed to Expand                       (Unit: %)
Capital Region Non-Capital Region
1. The aged Care service 42.3 44.6
2. Supporting service for children in dual income family & 
single parent family 25.5 23
3. Self-reliance supporting service for children in low income 
family 13.5 13.5
4. The disabled care service 6.5 6.7
5. Mother-infant care service 5 4.6
6. Others 20.7 21.2
Source: Social Survey of Koran Statistics Office in 2007
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6.3. Interim Conclusion
Despite of Korean government’s endeavor, the overall outcomes of fiscal 
decentralization in aspect of SNG is insignificant. It is mainly constrained by current 
institutions which restrict SNGs’ autonomy. The reforms launched to change the formal 
institutions were often frustrated by the interruptions of national bureaucrats and interest 
groups. The long history of centralism still exists in political actors and civil servants. 
In fiscal aspect, it can be characterized by: heavy dependence on intergovernmental 
transfers, weak tax autonomy, and centralized provision of public services despite of 
SNG’s fiscal expansion. The overall process of fiscal decentralization was controlled by 
national government, rather than initiatives of SNGs. As discussed above, the outcomes 
of fiscal decentralization as high social development expenditure can be assessed as 
desirable in that Korea has weak social development compared with other OECD 
countries. However, its side-effect of insufficient funding is constraining fiscal 
autonomy of SNGs.
The outcomes of fiscal decentralization in regional society have some various results. 
In the comparison with other OECD countries, Korea have relative better results in 
economic aspects (GDP per capita, unemployment), health status (infant mortality, life 
expectancy), education (school enrollment), and informatization (DOI index). 
Meanwhile, the income distribution (Gini Coefficient), public social and education 
expenditure, and the subjective life satisfaction are lower than the average of OECD. 
The result of regional comparison is quite similar to the cross-country comparison. 
The regional gap between Capital and Non capital region in GRDP, unemployment, 
infant mortality, life expectancy and information capacity (internet usage) decreased and 
the average rate enhanced. The comparison in subjective life also tells that Non capital 
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region is higher than Capital region. Meanwhile, the gap became larger in income 
distribution (income tax collection) and social welfare (social protection expenditure), 
which tells that population including the beneficiaries of social policies such as elder 
people still concentrated in Capital region. If it is taken into consideration that the 
redistribution of population is relatively long-term issue, the outcomes of 
decentralization for reducing regional disparity can be assessed as relatively positive. 
Again, however, such result is mainly attributed to the policy initiatives of national 
government, rather than the voluntary selection of SNG.
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7. CONCLUSION
This study has investigated the development of fiscal decentralization in Korea by 
interdisciplinary approach which combines methodology of case, history, policy process, 
and institution. Such holistic and comprehensive framework pursued genetic method 
whereby the systemic study of the causes, process, and interpretation of outcomes is 
possible. On the base of such framework, this study explored three research questions. 
The first question is what the main driving factors of fiscal decentralization in Korean 
government are since 1987. The research result answers that democratization and 
globalization are the main driving factors, which means theoretical arguments on the 
causes of fiscal decentralization have also relevance to explain Korean’s case. As 
Huntington (1991) exemplifies Korea as one of the third democratized countries, 
democratization is the crucial factor that has driven the fiscal decentralization in Korea. 
Despite of outstanding economic growth, over-centralized authoritarian regimes 
could not endure the demands from civil society. Democratization implicated that civil 
society, social welfare, peripheries, and SNGs have more voice than state, economy, 
center, and national government. Since 1987, successive governments, particularly 
presidents have supported decentralization in order to achieve political supports from 
regions and civil society. 
Globalization has also driven the fiscal decentralization. The direct election of local 
chiefs in 1995 may be a pre-arrangement for the OECD membership which needs 
accomplishment of full political decentralization. Since the financial crisis in 1997, 
globalization also impacted as the background of various reforms including 
decentralization. 
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The second question is what the characteristics of successive Korean governments are
in terms of policy process and what the outputs are in institutional and fiscal aspect.
Since 1987, successive governments have supported fiscal decentralization and tried to 
institutionalize and implement it through various measures. They have similarities in 
that: (1) independent organizations were established and most of decentralization
initiatives were launched by those; (2) among policy actors, the will of president was
the most significant factor which impact on whether decentralization policy succeed or 
not. Meanwhile, they have differences in that: (1) the contents of decentralization have 
differed from merely rhetoric to significant one; (2) the outputs are different mainly to 
the extent of political supports, particularly of the parliamentary. 
The overall policy process of successive governments shows developmental aspect 
which became close to that of developed countries where plural actors communicate and 
comprise. In the stage of policy agenda, the role of civil society and SNGs (and its 
associations) become significant although the initiatives are still hold by national 
government. In the stage of decision making and policy implement, related ministries
and their supporters intervened and often frustrated policies. The parliamentary also 
plays an important role in that most successive parliamentary have strong opposition
political parties.
The outputs in institutional and fiscal aspect have achievement and limitation at same 
time. First, in institutional aspect, intergovernmental relations become gradually moving 
from unilateral relationship to cooperative one. However, the extent of formal 
institutionalization was significantly low mainly due to the national government’s 
preference to administrative arrangement such as informal and irregular meetings. In 
fiscal aspect, the funding of local finance of each government was mainly based on 
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intergovernmental transfer rather than local taxes, and ad hoc approach rather than 
systemic approach with few exceptions.
The final question is what the outcomes of fiscal decentralization are in SNG and 
regional society in the prospects of economic and social development in Korea since 
1987. The one of the outstanding characteristics of outcomes in SNG is the structure of 
high expenditure and intergovernmental transfer with low tax revenue compared with 
other OECD countries. The main reason is that despite of Korean government’s 
endeavor for devolution of national affairs of national government to SNG, it still is 
much larger than autonomous affairs of SNG as the rate of national affairs and 
autonomous affairs has kept 73:15 in 2002 compared with 75:13 in 1994. Among the 
national affairs, much of national affairs are delegated to SNG with earmarked grants. 
Such functional disparity reflects on the fiscal structure as 80: 20 (total expenditure:
tax revenue) and the rate has kept steadily. The rigid disparity of functional assignment 
between national government and SNG is mainly attributed to the fail of reforms for 
reassigning of national government and SNG such as transferring of local special 
administrative organizations of national government to SNG or introducing municipal 
police system by the interruptions of bureaucrats of related ministries and interest 
groups. This result implicates that the long history of authoiritarism as one of informal 
institutions overwhelmed the reform of formal institutions.
The overall process of expending was also controlled by national government, rather 
than initiatives of SNGs. Although the high social development expenditure of SNG is 
desirable, it is mainly accomplished by the centralized provision of public services, 
constraining fiscal autonomy of SNGs by insufficient funding.
９８
The outcomes of fiscal decentralization in regional society show are quite equivocal. 
The economic growth is still outstanding compared with OECD other countries. The 
gaps between regions in GRDP become narrower than before. The outcomes in health 
status, life expectancy, infant mortality, education, and information capacity also are 
outstanding. However, regional disparity in income become larger and public social and 
educational expenditure is still low than OECD average. Most of all, the subjective 
indicators show that average Koreans think themselves unhappy than other OECD. 
Such results implicate that SNGs should reflect residents’ needs and demands on their 
policy process more, which can be possible through transferring more administrative 
and fiscal responsibilities from national government to SNGs.
Decentralization is still going on in Korea. The current government has been 
challenging the more fundamental issues such as rearranging territorial structures which 
is much debatable even among SNGs. However, what is the most important is sufficient 
argument and comprise rather than just impetuous unilateral decision. For this, further 
formal institutional reforms toward cooperative intergovernmental relations and 
endeavors to change informal institutions such as centralism should be necessary for 
consolidating democracy and facilitating more fiscal decentralization in Korea.
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Thesis Project(Revision) 
 The original title of thesis
- Fiscal decentralization and local government policy orientation in Czech and South Korea
 The revised title of thesis
- The Development of Fiscal decentralization in Republic of Korea since 1987
 The reason of revision
- While having been studied under the original title, the scope of study is broad unexpectedly. As a 
result, it can be expected that it is not possible to accomplish a meaningful thesis within the given 
time.
- Therefore, it is desirable to concentrate on more specific topic.
- The arguments and knowledge which have been gained by discussing with the thesis supervisor will 
not be abandoned and maintained even under the revised topic. 
 The Objective of revised topic
- The objective of revised topic is to examine the process of decentralization in Korea in context of 
globalization and democratization and its effects on regional economic and social development since 
1990s.
 The Potential Chapters
1. Introduction
2. Objective
- Assessing the process of decentralization in Korea in context of globalization and democratization
and its effects on regional economic and social development since 1987.
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3. Research Questions
- Why decentralization has happened in South Korea?
- Is decentralization caused by internal factors like democratization or external factors like 
globalization?
- Is there any change in the driving factors of decentralization?
- Who has claimed for or against decentralization? 
- What are the outcomes, risks, questions, discourses, and debates which are related to 
decentralization?
4. Methodology
- Policy process analysis, Morphology oriented analysis, Comparative analysis, Policy network 
analysis, Economic and social indicator analysis
5. Theoretical background: literature review
6. The history of decentralization in Korea
7. The process of decentralization in Korea
8. The impacts of decentralization in Korea
9. Conclusion
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